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WHERE THE SHADOW LIES 
SIN-
KIANG 
I. The Shadow 
On the morning of September 27, 1940 the cables hummed with 
news of a momentous ceremony. Japanese diplomats in Berlin 
had signed a military pact with Germany and Italy. That eve-
ning in Tokyo the Japanese people received a message from 
Emperor Hirohito. In their newspapers they read: "We are 
deeply gratified that a pact has been concluded between these 
three powers." The Emperor had spoken. A new alliance had 
been formed. And a lengthening shadow was spreading over 
Asia. 
TEN YEARS AGO AND NOW 
The shadow had first been cast on another September day 
nearly ten years before, when a railway explosion at Mukden 
had served as an excuse for the Japanese military to take over 
l\1anchuria. As we look back now with the advantage of hind-
sight, that day-September 18, 193 I-looms up as an important 
milestone. For Japan's seizure of Manchuria ended one historic 
era, and began another. It abruptly broke up the period of 
comparative peace that had succeeded the first World War. 
And it ushered in our present period of strife and unsettlement. 
Its indirect effects on European developments were also very 
great. We know that Japan's defiance lowered the prestige and 
authority of the League of Nations. It showed how hard it was 
to secure international cooperation strong enough to check 
determined aggression. Japan's example undoubtedly influ-
enced Mussolini and Hitler in the bold moves they made later 
on in Europe. 
After 1935 German and Italian expansion in Europe paral-
leled Japan's drive in the Far East. All of these movements 
steadily widened their scope. Increasingly these three powers 
played into one another's hands, and helped one another's 
advance. The anti-Comintern pact of November 1936 drew 
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them closer together. But they were not formally allied until 
September 27, 1940, when Japan signed the military pact with 
the Axis powers. 
This pact had startling implications. True, Germany and 
Italy were separated from Japan by vast distances. As long as 
Britain controlled the seas, the new allies could not actually 
join military forces. But Germany had only to put pressure 
on the French authorities at Vichy in order to help Japan win 
control over Indo-China. An Axis break-through in the Med-
iterranean, moreover, could swiftly bring her much greater aid. 
TOWARD A "NEW ORDER" 
It was this possibility that made Japan's aims, as outlined in the 
alliance, so significant. Berlin and Rome waved Japan ahead 
toward the conquest of "Greater East Asia." Until 1940 
Tokyo's official claims had reached out only to Manchuria and 
China. But the new term brought southeast Asia into the pic-
ture as well. This area would certainly include Indo-China, 
Siam, Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the Philip-
pines. On its outskirts lie Australia, New Zealand and India. 
By formally announcing "Greater East Asia" as Tokyo's sphere 
of influence, the Axis-Japan pact served as a blueprint of the 
Far Eastern sector of the world order which the Axis alliance 
hoped to establish. 
WHAT IS "GREATER EAST ASIA"? 
The new allies were seeking control over three continents. 
Germany and Italy were bidding for domination over Europe, 
Africa and the Near East, creating new and urgent problems 
for us. Tokyo'S bid for supremacy in "Greater East Asia" 
raised problems which were just as great. To many of us these 
problems seemed far away-much more remote than those of 
Europe, to which we are bound by so many close ties. Yet we 
know now that we should be making a mistake if we tried to 
close our eyes to them. 
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More than one billion people, or half the earth's population, 
live in the area embraced by "Greater East Asia." It is thus one 
of the most populous regions of the globe. Its territorial spread 
is equally large. Its outside limits range fr0!TI northern Japan 
to Australia, and from China and India to New Zealand. The 
whole North and South American continents, excluding Can-
ada, could be fitted comfortably into this vast territory. 
It is, besides, an area of great contrasts-greater, probably, 
than in any other region of the world. In a score of different 
localities conditions vary widely-climate, people, language, 
religion, economic life, government. Coolies working in Korean 
rice fields are a far cry from English-speaking Australian sheep 
ranchers, peasants in the remote interior of China from Malayan 
tin miners or East Indian rubber planters, Indian bazaars under 
a burning sun from Manchurian cities deep in their winter 
snows. 
A COLONIAL REGION 
Another feature of this region became especially important 
after Germany had conquered several European powers with 
Far Eastern possessions. For eastern Asia is one of the greatest 
colonial areas of the world, not even excepting Africa. From 
Korea to India runs a continuous chain of Japanese, French, 
American, Dutch and British holdings. Only Japan in the 
north, and Australia and New Zealand in the south, may be 
counted as fully independent countries. So this region is the 
scene not only of imperial rivalries, but of struggles for inde-
pendence on the part of native peoples. 
Thus many factors enter into the international developments 
affecting this region. Countless threads of policy connect it 
with Europe. They run to Berlin, and are woven into Hitler's 
plans; to London, where they tie in with the problem of what 
naval and air forces the British can spare for the Far East; to 
Vichy, and the attitude of the French Government there; and 
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to the refugee Netherlands authorities in Britain taking counsel 
on the fate of their colonies. Moscow is caught up in this dip-
lomatic network, and so is Washington-their moves can exert 
decisive influence on the course of events. 
JAPAN PULLS THE STRINGS 
Yet the main moving force in Far Eastern developments is 
Japan. In fact, Japan has been pulling the strings ever since 
September 18, 1931. The challenge to the status quo in East 
Asia proceeds from Tokyo, just as in Europe it proceeds from 
Berlin. Like Germany, but in even greater measure, Japan has 
the strategic advantage of a central position. She need not take 
too seriously the protests of European powers halfway across 
the globe, and she is well aware that the main centers of 
strength in the United States and the Soviet Union are almost 
equally distant. Only Japan, of the major powers, has her 
home bases wholly within the Far Eastern region. 
And so today we are forced to think more and more about 
Japan. In large part we are concerned with the immediate 
present. We want to know what Japan is doing, and what she 
intends to do. Yet we can understand her present foreign pol-
icy and form some idea of her probable future moves only if 
"\Ive know something of her past as well. We must seek out the 
forces that have shaped modern Japan. 
So in this book we shall go back to the legendary traditions 
of the Japanese nation, today being revived by Japanese patriots 
and preached as a state religion. We shall see how the belief in 
hereditary power as the privilege of the few has been strong 
in Japan from the earliest times, resisting the influence of demo-
cratic ideas from both China and the West; how even when 
Japan set up a constitutional government, the seats of ancient 
privilege were preserved; and how Japan, with her military 
leaders in the saddle, finally set out on the road to Empire. 
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II. Introducing Imperial Japan 
Japan proper, consisting of four closely connected islands, has 
often been compared to the British Isles. A map of the Eurasian 
continent shows the similarity of their geographical position. 
Japan's island chain is much longer, but it clings to the Asiatic 
mainland very much as the British Isles cling to the European 
mainland. The Straits of Tsushima take the place of the Eng-
lish Channel. 
Actually, however, Japan is much farther from the mainland 
than Britain, even in the narrow waters of Tsushima. The 
steamer from Shimonoseki takes nearly eight hours in crossing 
over to Fusan, on the tip of the Korean peninsula. This fact 
has had important historical results. The stretch of water has 
been wide enough to make invasion difficult-at least until mod-
ern times. Yet it has not been so wide as to bar cultural 
exchanges with the mainland. 
JAPAN AND THE ASIATIC MAINLAND 
During historic times, for roughly 2,000 years, Japan was never 
successfully invaded. In 1066 William the Conqueror success-
fully invaded England. But two centuries later, in 1274 and 
1281, Kublai Khan's Mongol-Chinese armies twice failed to 
conquer Japan. For long periods, when Japan's rulers so wished, 
they were able to isolate their country more or less completely 
from the Asiatic mainland. 
On the other hand, Japan was close enough to the continent 
to benefit from the earlier growth of civilization there. From 
the very beginning of Japanese national life, we can trace sig-
nificant advances to the coming of peoples and cultures from 
the Korean peninsula: At times, notably in the seventh and 
eighth centuries, the flood of cultural influences from China 
almost swamped Japan and threatened to sweep away her 
native institutions. During the past century Western influence 
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has caused equally great changes in Japanese life. Each time, 
however, a solid core of Japanese tradition resisted destruction, 
and shaped the new elements into a social pattern characteris-
tically Japanese. 
JAPAN'S ISLAND HOME 
Many local features of Japan's island home are as important 
as its geographical position. Its natural beauties have fed the 
highly developed aesthetic sense of the Japanese people. No 
one who has traveled the Inland Sea can forget its sparkling 
waters, or the lovely islands which dot its surface. The majes-
tic beauty of Mt. Fuji is world famous. Hallowed associa-
tions enhance its snow-capped splendor for the Japanese. 
Not all characteristics of the group of Japanese islands are so 
favorable. Many of its mountains are volcanic in origin. Sev-
eral volcanoes are still active. Earthquakes occur frequently. 
(The disastrous earthquake of 1923, with over 150,000 dead 
and injured, is still fresh in our memories.) Typhoons, sweep-
ing in from the sea in destructive assault, are also common. So 
nature contributes an element of insecurity to the life of the 
Japanese, offsetting the protection their isolation gives them. 
Today other natural features give rise to a more serious inse-
curity. Japan's territory is small, barely the size of California, 
the population is large and prolific. Four-fifths of the islands are 
so mountainous that they are useless for the intensive rice cul-
tivation which is the principal Japanese agricultural pursuit. In 
recent times, when modern industry became necessary, the 
Japanese islands were found to lack most minerals. Water 
power is abundant, and can be harnessed to produce electricity. 
There are considerable reserves of coal, though not of good 
coking quality. But there is little iron, and even less of the 
minor but still important metals. To these factors, which have 
not prevented the Japanese from becoming an industrial nation, 
we shall have to return later on. 
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WHO ARE THE JAPANESE? 
Like all modern peoples, the Japanese of today are a mixed 
race. In prehistoric times one migrant people after another 
overran the islands. The ocean set a barrier to further migra-
tion. So the invaders had to settle down, either exterminating 
the people already there or else intermarrying with them. 
The last invasions must have occurred early in the Christian 
era. Scholars are not agreed on the exact racial proportions of 
the groups which mingled to form the modern Japanese people. 
The basic stock is probably Mongolian, the result of migrations 
through Korea from the north Asiatic continent. There is 
apparently a southern admixture, coming from either southeast 
China or Malaysia. Many of these groups were late invaders of 
JAPAN'S ISLAND HOME 
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A Magatama, or bead 
ornament, common in early 
Japanese tombs. Often 
made of jade, nephrite 
or chrysoprase-materials 
found not in Japan but in 
the Ural-Baikal regions. 
the islands. They found there an 
Ainu people, possibly of Cau-
casian racial origin. Ainu remnants 
still survive in Japan, but most of 
them have been absorbed or exter-
minated in the course of centuries 
of warfare. 
Three main racial elements thus 
entered into the making of the 
Japanese people. To the Mongol 
strain is undoubtedly due the war-
like spirit of the Japanese, while 
from southeast Asia comes a my-
thology that has been interwoven 
with Japan's political institutions. Later, there were also many 
Chinese and Korean immigrants. By the end of the seventh 
century, according to one source, more than one-third of 
Japan's noble families claimed Chinese or Korean descent. 
EARLY JAPANESE INSTITUTIONS 
To understand modern Japan, we need to study the past even 
more than in the case of most Western nations. For survivals 
of ancient traditions playa large part in Japan's national life 
today. These beliefs and practices can be traced back for 
nearly two thousand years. What were these institutions like 
in their earliest form? 
Historians give only a partial answer to this question. The 
latest island invaders, who became the dominant Japanese, were 
a group of clans or tribes. Leadership in these clans was heredi-
tary. The clan elder was both chieftain and high priest. He 
supervised or performed sacrifices to the clan god, who was 
usually held to be his direct ancestor. All clansmen were sup-
posedly united by blood ties to the clan elder, and thus shared 
in the divine descent. 
14 
liTHE WAY OF THE GODS" 
Societies ruled by a priest-king, usually called "theocracies," 
have existed in many parts of the world. In Japan, however, 
theocracy grew all the stronger because of a mythological tra-
dition, later called Shinto, or "Way of the Gods," centering 
about a Sun Goddess (Amaterasu). There were many aspects 
to Shinto, including an early nature worship. But its main 
feature came to be the story of the Sun Goddess, whose 
descendants were the Japanese people. Early in their history the 
rulers of Japan raised this myth to the dignity of a state cult. 
The chieftain of the Yamato clan, the strongest of all, claimed 
direct descent from the Sun Goddess. This claim was a very 




III.} ants of the Islands 
real thing in Japan. It was taken much more literally than our 
vaguer Western idea of "the divine right of kings," which per-
sisted until the eighteenth century in Europe. 
The clansmen were aristocrats who handed on their privi-
leges from father to son, and to whom war was second nature. 
But agriculture, in the shape of the cultivation of rice, was 
already a cornerstone in the economy of this early Japanese 
society. Under the clansmen were "guilds" of farmers and arti-
sans, who did most of the productive work. Membership in 
these producing units also passed from father to son. These 
serfs, as well as a smaller number of actual slaves, were made 
up largely of war captives, conquered natives, or immigrants 
from Korea. 
The chief ideas of this primitive Shinto society are quite 
clear. There was a strong emphasis on the hereditary principle. 
The idea of an aristocracy of the blood was strengthened by 
the idea of descent from the gods. Government was by men, 
not by law. The clan or group, not the individual, was impor-
tant. The mass of the people lived to serve their rulers. We 
shall see how these primitive ideas-so like the totalitarian ideas 
of" today - have influenced Japanese history through the· 
centuries. 
BEGINNINGS OF A NATION-STATE 
At first the invading clans were not unified. There was little 
centralized government. The Yamato chieftain had only a 
shadowy authority over the other clans. He was "first among 
equals," rather than an overlord. He controlled directly the 
territory held by his own clan, but not the lands of other clans. 
Nor did his religious authority extend far beyond his own clan. 
During the first four or five centuries of the Christian era 
this picture was steadily changing. Most of central and western 
Japan was conquered and occupied as the result of a long series 
of wars. The power of the Yamato clan was growing. Its 
16 
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chieftain was becoming the ruler of a centralized state. His 
position was approaching that of a king. Lesser leaders were 
being attached to this "Emperor," and were assuming the role 
of ministers at the "court." 
In other ways, too, the various clans were merging into a 
centralized state. The Emperor, as the direct descendant of the 
Sun Goddess, came to be recognized as divine ruler of the 
whole Japanese people. More and more the Japanese thought 
of themselves as a single patriarchal family, headed by "the 
Sovereign that is a manifest God." Ancestors of the other clan 
leaders, also divine, were brought into relation with those of the 
Emperor, but in subordinate rank. The strongest clans were 
able to claim descent from deities closely associated with the 
Sun Goddess. 
CONQUESTS IN KOREA 
These political and religious changes were the outward signs 
of an underlying movement of growth and expansion. A larger 
and larger area of the islands was being occupied. The popula-
tion was growing, and additional economic un.its, or "guilds," 
were being formed. Japanese armies were fighting in Korea, 
where they dominated the southern region of the peninsul~ 
for long periods. Through this contact with the mai~and, a 
stream of Korean immigrants, and even some Chinese, flowed 
into Japan. Many of them were , educated scribes, Buddhist 
priests or expert artisans. By the fifth century the Japanese 
had learned the rudiments of Ch~nese writing, and in the sixth 
century Buddhism was officially introduced from Korea. The 
wealth of Chinese civilization was thus opened up to the 
Japanese people. 
THE OLD ORDER BREAKS DOWN 
By the sixth century, Japan faced new and difficult problems. 
Old forms of government were breaking down. The simple 
clan rule, based on blood ties, was being upset by migrations 
within, and immigration from without. New leaders were fak-
ing their family trees, in order to claim divine descent. The 
clan chieftains found their priestly control over the people 
slipping, and had to try the use of political and military 
power instead. 
Special difficulties arose when new areas were conquered, or 
large numbers of immigrants arrived. There were disputes 
between clans, some of which favored "guilds" and some a 
freer order of serfs. The Imperial clan proved able to get the 
richest of the new areas, and to extend the lands and increase 
the people under its control. But this did not settle the problem. 
F or the leading clans tried to control the Emperor, and fought 
over rival claimants to the throne. 
These bitter quarrels threatened to tear the new state apart. 
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A more effective centralization, both of economic and political 
power, had obviously become necessary. The groundwork had 
been laid, and the times called for a drastic change. The model 
was sought in China, then flourishing under the T' ang Dynasty 
(618-907 A.D.). 
III. Imitating the Chinese 
One of the most dramatic episodes Qf mQdern histQry has been 
Japan's adoption Qf Western institutiQns and techniques. But 
the interesting thing is that such whQlesale bQrrQwings were 
nQt new in the history Qf Japan. More than a thousand years 
earlier she had drawn similarly Qn Chinese civilization. That 
earlier period, moreover, was akin to. the later in Qne significant 
respect-the Qld Japanese ways persisted under the new shell. 
The changes were Qnly .skin-deep. And the mQre important 
beliefs and practices that featured- the early clan sQciety we 
have been studying cQntinued to. govern Japanese behaviQr. 
Japan's contacts with China had begun well before the sev-
enth century, the period when they became so. marked. At first 
these contacts had been only secQndhand, through Korea. 
Direct relatiQns with China had been established early in the 
fifth century, but had remained unofficial. The first Qfficial 
Japanese envQY, was sent to the Sui Dynasty in 607 A.D., and 
a secQnd embassy followed in 608. In the two. centuries after 
630, no. less than twelve Japanese embassies visited the T'ang 
court at Ch'ang-an, located Qn the site Qf the mQdern city Qf 
Sian (see map opposite) . These two hundred years were 
'China's golden age, when dazzling Ch'ang-an was the wQrld's , 
foremost civilized center. Japanese monks and scholars aCCQm-
panied the embassies, often remaining in China for IQng periods 
Qf study. They brought back to Japan a thorough knQwledge 
of Chinese culture-much as Japanese students have returned 
frQm Western countries with new knowledge and skills during 
the past eighty years Qr so. 
CHINA BECOMES THE "GLASS OF FASHION" 
Chinese civilization, during the seventh and eighth centuries, 
was transplanted to Japan on a vast scale. N ara, the new J ap-
anese capital (see map QPPQsite), was built Qn the lavish model 
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ROUTES TO THE CONTINENT 
7-Sth CENTURIES 
CHI NA 
(T'A N G) 
of Ch'ang-an. Court society became highly sophisticated. The 
ability to write a good Chinese hand, or turn a Chinese verse, 
was the indispensable equipment of an educated man. The first 
national histories of Japan were written-most of them in the 
Chinese language. Buddhism flourished. Japanese artistic skill 
expressed itself in masterpieces of sculpture and architecture, 
modeled on T'ang examples but individual in genius and exe-
cution. Native Japanese poetry flowered and, in general, this 
was the classic age of Japanese culture. 
In the field of government the Japanese also imitated the 
T 'ang system. They declared the land "nationalized"-or sub-
ject only to the Emperor's control. They reorganized local gov-
ernment, putting Imperial officials in direct control, especially 
of tax revenues. In China such officials were chosen through an 
examination system, so examinations were introduced in Japan. 
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The Emperor was now, in theory at least, the all-po"verful 
head of the Japanese state. 
BUT IT'S CHINA-"WITH A DIFFERENCE" 
These reforms were not amateurish. They were based on a 
good knowledge of the principles and practices of the Chinese 
system. Yet in their pure Chinese form they worked against 
certain ingrained Japanese ideas, most of all the hereditary prin-
ciple. So, from the beginning, the Japanese changed the Chinese 
system as they took it over. The changes may not have seemed 
great at the time, but they were really basic. Within a few cen-
turies, the new institutions had produced an entirely different 
result in Japan. Only in form did they bear any resemblance 
to the institutions of China. 
The clearest example of such changes is the way Japan's 
statesmen treated the Chinese examination system. In China, at 
its best, this was a real civil service system. For centuries the 
path to public office lay through success in the examinations. 
Sons of great families undoubtedly had a better chance of suc-
ceeding, and bribery and favoritism were rife in decadent 
periods. But the "success story" of the Horatio Alger type fills 
Chines~ literature. In not a few cases, the poor but ' brilliant 
Chinese youth passes the examinations with honors, and 
becomes a powerful and wealthy official. 
THE ARISTOCRAT'S PLACE IN THE SUN 
This system was altogether too democratic for japan's clan 
society, with its emphasis on aristocratic lineage. At the very 
outset it was drastically modified. Training schools were set up, 
but only nobles of a certain rank could enter them. These per-
sons alone could take the examinations, find qualify for high 
office. After a time, even the examinations were discontinued. 
Important government posts soon became herepitary again. 
Lower posts in the provinces were usually take~ by local lead-
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"Japanese artistic skill expressed itself in )masterpieces of 
sculpture ••. modeled on T'ang examples." 
ers, instead of officers sent by the Imperial government. The 
higher provincial officials meanwhile stayed at court, and 
delegated their powers to personal followers in the various 
localities. 
A similar development took place in the case of the land 
reform$. The land was "nationalized," but it proved impossible 
to preserve the public domain. The great estates of the clan 
leaders were returned to them in payment for their official ser-
vices, and then remained hereditary. Powerful individuals 
encroached on the public lands, or impoverished peasants 
escaped tax exactions by joining their lands to privately owned 
manors, and becoming serfs. In practice, the public domain 
was gradually taken over by private families, the court nobil-
ity or the great monasteries. 
THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE • 
As these private estates were usually tax-free, the Imperial gov-
ernment was soon deprived of its revenue. And so, as time went 
on, the Emperor became a mere figurehead. Elaborate state 
councils and ministries, patterned after those of China, became 
nothing more than ceremonial forms. Yet centralization was 
maintain~d for several centuries, with the great Fujiwara fam-
ily as the real power behind the throne. This family held vast 
provincial estates, controlled many of the local officials, and 
dominated the court. By wedding the Imperial princes to Fuji-
wara ladies, it reduced the Emperors to puppets. The Fujiwara 
dictatorship ruled a much more intricate and cultured society 
than had existed in the early clan period. On the surface, this 
new society was Chinese; in fact, it was still run in the old 
Japanese way. 1\ 
Changes there had been, however. The courtier had replaced 
the warrior. Instead of fighting clan chieftains, a bureaucracy 
of civilians now ruled. Buddhism had pervaded Japanese society 
from top to bottom. The teachings of Confucius had also been 
introduced from China. F or a time the home-grown Shinto 
religion was overshadowed, and lay dormant. But it was not 
wholly eclipsed. The Emperor reigned, if he did not rule. 
Though the Shinto ritual, playing up the Emperor's descent 
from the Sun Goddess, might be neglected, it was never lost. 
Japanese government was still theocratic (centering on a priest-
king), even if a Fujiwara pulled the strings and bureaucrats 
played all the active roles. 
IV. Japan Bars Her Door 
We must now leap several centuries to about 1550, when the 
first Western traders and missionaries reached Japan. 
The Japan of 1550 differed greatly from the Japan of the 
Fujiwara era we left behind us five or six centuries earlier. 
The Fujiwara power had passed away in the twelfth century. 
Its civilian government had grown weak. It could not even 
keep the peace. As disorder grew in the provinces, great inde-
pendent lords surrounded themselves with military retainers on 
their private estates. A feudal society gradually emerged. In 
1 185 one of these feudal lords established his supremacy over 
the others, and soon obtained Imperial appointment as "Sho-
gun," or Generalissimo. The Emperor's court still carried on 
at Kyoto, but political control passed increasingly to the Sho-
guns, who becalne military dictators. A military aristocracy-
but a rapidly shifting one-dominated Japan. As new feudal 
lords grevv in strength, they would challenge the Shogun'S 
authority and bitter civil wars would follow. Strife and dis-
order amounting to anarchy marked the centUry which pre-
ceded 1550. 
Then the trend was reversed. By 1590, through the work of 
three gr~at leaders-N obunaga, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu-the 
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country was unified again. In the brief period that followed-
say, until 1625-Japan was confronted with a fateful question. 
Should it embark on a program of military and commercial 
expansion, similar to that which Western nations were just 
entering upon? For a time it seemed that the answer might be 
"yes." In the end, it was "no." And that "no" changed the 
whole course of Far Eastern'and perhaps world history. In 1603 
Ieyasu established the T okugawa Shogunate, destined to rule 
Japan for more than 250 years. After 1616, under his successors, 
the seclusion policy was gradually adopted, and Japan was 
practically isolated from the outside world. 
Was this choice inevitable? We cannot really tell. We do 
know that in the period just before she barred her door Japan 
was reaching outward toward full intercourse with the West. 
REACHING OUTWARD 
F or the last thirty years of the sixteenth century were a 
dynamic period in Japanese history. An excess of energy in 
Japan seemed to match the urge for discovery and conquest 
that stirred the rising nations of Europe. 
Japan's domestic and foreign trade had been increasing at a 
rapid pace. Native industries had grown, and trade guilds had 
flourished. After I 550 this commercial development leaped for-
ward. Sakai, a great trading center, became virtually a free city, 
ruled by its merchant princes. Nagasaki was opened to foreign 
trade in 1570, and soon developed into a thriving port. At this 
time, too, Japanese ships, often on piratical expeditions, were 
venturing into the waters of the Philippines and Siam. In groups 
and as individuals, Japanese emigrants were found at various 
ports in southeast Asia. Hideyoshi even conceived the project 
of conquering China, but after overrunning Korea in 1592-93, 
his armies (numbering 150,000 men) were defeated. 
Mter 1550 missionaries and traders from Portugal, Spain, 
Holland and England came to Japan in growing numbers. The 
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Japanese eagerly seized upon Western products and technical 
advances, notably in firearms and shipbuilding. These commer-
cial contacts with the West ll10dified Japan's economy and 
stimulated her industrial development. F or several decades 
Christianity, introduced by St. Francis Xavier in 1549-51, was 
welcomed. Some of the feudal lords became Christians. By 16 I 7 
there were some 300,000 Christian converts, or nearly as many 
as today. 
JAPAN SENDS ENVOYS TO SPAIN 
F or a time, there was the possibility of even more extensive 
contacts between T okugawa Japan and the West. Ieyasu, the 
first Tokugawa Shogun, deliberately sought to make Japan a 
great center of international trade. China, mindful of Hide-
yoshi's Korean invasions, rebuffed him. He then turned to the 
West-that is, to Spain, then the richest trading nation of 
Europe. In 1610 Ieyasu concluded a commercial treaty with 
the Spanish governor of the Philippines. In 1610 and 1614 J ap-
anese envoys crossed the Pacific and visited some of the Span-
ish possessions in America. Then they \-vent on across the Atlan-
tic. In Madrid the Japanese envoy had an audience with King 
Philip ilIon January 30, 1615; later, he saw the Pope at Rome. 
The Spanish king, however, influenced by the anti-Christian 
persecutions that had already occurred in Japan, rej ected 
Ieyasu's request for a treaty establishing trade relations with 
Spain and the Spanish-American possessions. 
BUT FINALLY PULLS IN HER LINES 
It was not until more than two centuries later that such an 
opportunity presented itself again. For soon after Ieyasu's death 
in 1616, the policy of national seclusion was adopted. 
Many factors led to this decision. The narrow intolerance 
of the missionaries, as well as conflicts between rival Jesuit and 
Franciscan orders, had created difficulties almost from the 
beginning of their stay in Japan. More important was the fear 
that estates of the Christian lords might become centers of 
rebellion, and thus lay Japan open to conquest by a foreign 
power. Persecution began under Hideyoshi, and after 1616 a 
series of anti-Christian edicts was issued. The Christian perse-
cutions reached their height in 1622-24, although Christianity 
was not fully stamped out until 1638. 
At this time Japanese were forbidden to go abroad, and the 
building of large sea-going vessels was also prohibited. All for-
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eign traders and priests either left Japan or were expelled. A 
small Dutch trading center, restricted after 1641 to the islet 
patch of Deshima, was all that remained of the early period of 
intercourse with the West. By 1650 the policy of national seclu-
sion, introduced by the Shoguns of the Tokugawa clan, was in 
full force. It was maintained until after the middle of the nine-
teenth century, or well into the modern era. 
THE DUTCH OASIS ON DESHIMA 
We should be on guard, however, against some common errors 
about this important period in Japan's history. The tern1 
"hermit nation" must not be taken too literally. Seclusion was 
not complete. Through the Dutch settlement on Deshima, ideas 
from Europe filtered into Japan. A small group of Japanese 
scholars studied the Dutch language. In 1745 they prepared a 
Dutch-Japanese dictionary, and in 1774 a Dutch textbook on 
anatomy was translated. Of course, Japan did not keep abreast 
of Western technical progress during the Tokugawa epoch. 
But valuable beginnings were made, especially in language 
study, medicine, geography, map-making and military science. 
Another common error associated with the idea of a "hermit 
nation" is that Tokugawa Japan remained static for two hun-
dred years. In reality great internal changes occurred during 
this period, some of which were fundamental. By 1850 Japan 
was a very different country from what it had been in 1650. 
The seeming lack of development was most evident in the 
Tokugawa political system. Its broad outlines did not, in fact, 
change very much. The Emperor and his court "\vere kept 
secluded at Kyoto. The real center of government lay in 
Tokyo, where the Shoguns and their ministers ruled. Most 
of the land was owned by the Tokugawa family and the great 
feudal lords (daimy 0) closely associated with it. About three-
eighths, however, was owned by the "outer lords," such as 
Choshu and Satsuma. These "outer lords" were viewed as 
potential rebels, and were denied posts in the central administra-
tion. All of the feudal lords had to spend certain months in 
attendance on the Shogun at Tokyo, and had to leave their 
families there as hostages when they went back to their o\vn 
lands. 
FOUR CLASSES OF SOCIETY 
Efforts were made to draw strict class lines. The feudal lords 
and their military retainers, or samurai, held the highest rank. 
The farmers came next, but they were severely taxed and 
harshly treated. The townspeople were looked upon as the 
lowest class of all. A samurai had the right to cut down a 
merchant with his sword, but very early in the Tokugawa 
period he learned to respect the power of the merchant's 
purse. 
Yet all measures to preserve a rigid centralized feudalism, 
and to nlaintain Tokugawa rule, proved futile. Halfway 
through the period serious economic problems began to ap-
pear. By 1850 the whole system was on the verge of collapse. 
THE SHOGUNS FAIL TO CONTROL THE MERCHANTS 
In their attempts to prevent change, the Shoguns were unable 
to master one basic element in their society-trade and industry. 
Even before the Tokugawa regime was established, as we have 
seen, Japan's commerce had already grown sizable. Foreign 
trade was then cut off. But internal trade, stimulated by a long 
period of peace, continued to develop. New luxury goods of 
many varieties were produced, and industry prospered. The 
merchant class in the cities grew wealthy and powerful. Large 
business houses, including the present Mitsui firm, were 
founded. Money, instead of rice, became the medium of 
exchange. The transition to a money economy was gradual, 
but it worked a revolution in Japanese society. 
Incomes of the daimy 0 and samurai were in rice. The rice had 
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to be changed into money, and great exchange marts-similar 
to our modern commodity exchanges-grew up in Osaka. The 
rice brokers "rigged" prices. Dizzy price fluctuations occurred. 
The feudal lords and their samurai fell into debt to the 
rice brokers and the money lenders. Government intervention 
did not help matters. The Shogunate either debased the coinage, 
or tried vainly to control prices by decree. The farmers 
suffered most of all-from the change to money, from the 
price fluctuations, and from still heavier taxes when the feudal 
lords became indebted to the merchants. Mter 1725 the num-
ber of farmers declined; after 1750 peasant uprIsIngs were 
frequent. 
AND FACE A RISING REVOLT 
In other ways, too, loyalty to the Shogunate was undermined. , 
The luxury of the towns stimulated a type of life quite the 
opposite from that inspired by the Spartan ethical code, called 
Bushido, of the samurai. Rich townspeople craved amusement 
-and painting, the drama, and the novel flourished. No laws 
could prevent the samurai from being drawn to this life, nor 
could executing a more than usually lavish merchant or 
usurer turn back the tide of the new age. 
Other intellectual currents were more acutely dangerous 
to the Shogunate. Ancient history, literature and religion were 
studied, and there was a revival of interest in Shintoism. From 
these historical and literary schools there grew a political move-
ment, aimed at restoring the Emperor to his former place as 
ruler of the nation. 
Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the country 
was ripe for revolt. In the background lay the misery and dis-
tress of the farmer. But the active promoters of this revolu-
tionary overthrow of the ' Shogunate were discontented groups 
within the ruling class. Four of these groups banded together 
to bring about the Restoration: (I) the "outer lords" of Cho-
shu, Satsuma and the other western fiefs; ( 2 ) the lesser 
samurai, ambitious and energetic; (3) the merchants, who 
desired removal of feudal restrictions on their business activi-
ties; and (4) the court nobles of ancient lineage who still 
clung to the Emperor at Kyoto. This was a powerful coali-
tion, and sooner or later it would undoubtedly have brought 
down the Shogunate through its own strength. As it happened, 
pressure on Japan from Western nations came to its aid and 
hastened the outbreak of the revolt that was brewing inside 
the country. I ' 
;' 
v. How the Door Was Opened 
By the nineteenth century, a new flood of Western influence 
was sweeping into the Far East. As in the age of explora-
tion and discovery, the West was knocking at the door. 
In those earlier days, we must remember, the West had had 
little to offer in the way of progress. In fact, in the arts and 
in the graces of civilized life, the East could have given 
pointers to the West. But now the West came strong in the 
might of the industrial revolution. Master of machine tech-
nique, it was turning out manufactured products in larg~r and 
larger quantities. It was extending international trade by leaps 
and bounds. It was seeking new markets and sources of raw 
materials throughout the world. And the most powerful of the 
Western countries were staking out colonies wherever they 
could. 
A PERIOD OF TRANSITION 
1853 to 1868 were the years of transition for Japan. They 
were crowded with events that laid the cornerstone of the 
modern Japanese Empire. 
Two broad trends were uppermost during these years. First, 
there was the coming of the Western powers with their de-
mand for diplomatic relations, trade and intercourse-in a word, 
for the end of the seclusion policy and the opening of japan's 
door. Of course, the Shogun, as the ruling power, had the 
job of dealing with the Western nations. Too weak to resist, 
he had to give way. And his enemies at home seized on this 
opportunity to discredit him. The second main trend, there-
fore, was the sharpening of Japan's internal conflict. 
The extraordinary thing about this internal conflict in Japan 
was this. The groups opposing the Shogunate were revolu-
tionaries: they rejected the existing system and fought for a 
, new one. They sought progress for Japan-and progress meant 
opening the country to Western influence. Yet in their struggle 
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with the Shoguns they were all against the foreigner. The 
reason is not far to seek. Anti-foreign demonstrations provided 
a handy weapon for attacking and discrediting the Shogunate. 
As we shall see later on, when it had served its purpose, this 
weapon was dropped. 
But, meanwhile, let us look a little mor~ closely at the two 
broad trends we have mentioned. Let us see first how, by a 
series of steps taken between 1853 and 1867, Japan's door was 
gradually opened. 
THE "UNEQUAL" TREATIES 
What happened to Japan in her relations with the Western 
powers at this time had previously happened to China. For 
a long time there had been a closely regulated Western trade 
at Canton. During the early nineteenth century this trade had 
steadily expanded. China's last-minute efforts to keep real con-
trol in her own hands were unsuccessful. The Anglo-Chinese 
war of 1839-42, and further conflicts in 1857-60, ended China's 
seclusion and forced the lVlanchu authorities to treat with the 
Western powers on terms of diplomatic equality. The treaties 
signed at this time-later called the "unequal" treaties-actually 
established China's inequality. Not oilly were new ports 
opened to Western trade. But a fixed schedule of Chinese tariff 
dues, usually not exceeding 5 per cent, was also enforced. In 
addition, Western nationals were exempted from trial under 
Chinese law. Instead, they were to be tried in courts set up 
by their own consuls in China. This was the system known 
as "extraterritoriality." 
These events in China did not pass unnoticed in Japan. 
Many of the Japanese leaders, despite the Shogunate's policy 
of isolation, were aware of what was happening in China. 
They began to be alarmed over Japan's future, fearing that the 
Western powers would soon be knocking at Japan's door. 
And sure enough, very soon they were. 
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COMMODORE PERRY BRINGS A LETTER 
The visits of Commodore Perry's squadron to Japan in 1853 
and 1854, bearing President Fillmore's letter asking for the 
opening of trade relations, were the prelude. Commodore 
Perry secured the first treaty, on March 31, 1854. More im-
portant was the commercial treaty (July 29, 1858) negotiated 
by Townsend Harris, first American Minister to Japan. This 
treaty opened five Japanese ports to Americans for trade 
and residence, and-like the treaties with China-provided for 
a fixed tariff schedule and extraterritoriality. It was the model 
for similar agreements, also concluded in 1858, with England, 
France, Russia and Holland. All of these treaties were signed 
by the Shogun, but not by the Emperor. Later, as the Emper-
or's power grew, the opposition sought to prevent applica-
tion of the treaties on the ground that the Emperor had not 
ratified them. In November 1865, however, an Allied naval 
demonstration off Osaka forced the Emperor to give his 
signature. Finally, in June 1866, a tariff convention set 5 per 
cent as the duty on practically all imports and exports. 
We shall have to return to these treaties a little later. 
For soon after the Restoration of the Emperor, they became 
a galling yoke to the Japanese. The tariff and extraterritorial 
provisions, in particular, were resented as shackles on the full 
exercise of Japan's sovereignty. Three long decades were to 
pass before Japan gained enough strength, toward the close 
of the century, to revise these unequal treaties. 
THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN JAPAN 
At the time the treaties were negotiated, however, the issue was 
not one of equality. The issue was whether there should be 
any treaties at all. For many Japanese wanted no opening of 
japan's door. After the first treaties, nevertheless, a growing 
number of Westemers began to live in the ports opened to 
foreigners. The cry to "expel the foreigner" was then raised, 
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Coupled with this slogan was the challenging demand to 
"revere the Emperor" -a direct call to revolution against the 
Shogun. The whole country was aroused. It seethed with 
internal strife and dissension, with plots and counter-plots, 
and even with armed conflict. 
The anti-foreign movement was merely the spark that 
set off a bonfire that had been long in the making. By 1850 
the Shogunate was nearly bankrupt. The feudal lords, or 
daimyo, were in the same position. Most/of their landed prop-
erty was mortgaged to the merchant-bankers-the rising 
capitalist class. Thousands of samurai were poverty-stricken. 
The condition of the peasantry, taxed more and more heavily 
to pay for the debts of the feudal lords, was desperate. Even 
the wealthy merchants, irked by feudal restrictions and the 
social and political inferiority that was forced upon them, were 
dissatisfied. The demand for change was growing broader and 
deeper. 
SUPPORTERS OF THE EMPEROR 
In Kyoto the Emperor had become the center of an active 
and determined political movement. Its platform-anti-foreign 
and anti-Tokugawa-called for the restoration of the Imperial 
power. The court nobles and a growing number of the samurai 
and feudal lords supported it. Wealthy merchant-banker fami-
lies, such as the Mitsui house, provided it with cash. Above 
all, the movement was eventually backed by a coalition of the 
western clans, notably those of Choshu and Satsuma. The part 
these clans played, both in the Restoration movement and in 
the later Imperial government, was decisive. 
THE ROLE OF THE WESTERN CLANS 
These clans, you will remember, were ruled by so-called "outer 
lords," who were denied a part in the Tokugawa administra-
tion. The fact that they were so far from the center of govern-
ment at Tokyo encouraged the1!1 to be independent. More-
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THE RISE OF THE 
WESTERN CLANS 
(Mid-19th Centu ry) 
a few of the more im nt feudal lords are 
over, they were in many respects the strongest and most 
progressive of the leading Japanese clans. In developing manu-
facture and trade as a means of boosting clan revenue, Satsuma, 
Choshu, Tosa and Hizen were far ahead of other clans; They 
fostered not only handicrafts, porcelain manufacture, sugar-
refining and textile mills, but mining, iron foundries, gun-
making, shipbuilding and allied military industries. Choshu 
also made a revolutionary change in its army, by including 
commoners as well as the samurai in its ranks. 
In these western clans, the anti-foreign' spirit was at first 
intense. F or some years, in defiance of the Shogunate, the 
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clans carried on what was practically an 'independent war 
against the Western powers and the new treaty rights of 
Westerners in Japan. They frequently attacked foreigners 
. and · their employees. Things came to a head in 1863-64, when 
they tried to expel the foreigners. In August 1863, in retalia-
tion for the murder of an Englishman by Satsuma clansmen, a 
British squadron bombarded the Satsuma port of Kagoshima. 
And in September 1864 an Allied fleet (British, Dutch, French, 
American) destroyed Choshu forts at Shimonoseki which had 
been firing on Western vessels passing through the narrow 
straits. 
These decisive proofs of Western military and naval superi-
ority gave Satsuma and Choshu pause. Both clans stopped their 
anti-foreign activities. They had long seen the need of acquir-
ing modern armaments. This determination was now made 
doubly strong. Many other leaders came to see that Japan could 
not keep her door shut forever, and that her salvation lay in 
mastering Western techniques. Once having grasped this prin-
ciple, they acted on it boldly and unhesitatingly. 
THE RESTORATION 
The Emperor's prestige-and, indeed, actual authority-had 
grown steadily throughout this transition period. As early as 
1858, recognizing the Emperor's new importance, the Shogun 
sought his approval of greater intercourse with the West. In 
1863 the Shogun even obeyed an Imperial summons to Kyoto. 
The advent of a new Shogun and a new Emperor in 1867 
made the transfer of authority all the easier. In November 1867 
the new Shogun resigned, and on January 3, 1868 the Emperor 
Meiji, backed by the western clans, formally assumed control 
of the nation. Six months later the Tokugawa forces, taking the 
field in opposition to the seizure of power by the western 
clans, were defeated in pitched battle. A . new Empire had 
been founded. 
VI. Catching up with the West 
Great difficulties faced the early Meiji reformers. Their essen-
tial task was to catch up with the West. For two centuries 
Japan had kept to herself. During this period the Western 
world had made gigantic technical advances, greater than man 
had achieved in all preceding history. Japan had been left 
far behind. She was forced to do in decades what the West 
had done in centuries. 
How could Japan accomplish such a task? In both economy 
and government she was still largely feudal and decentralized. 
There was no real national state, as we understand that term 
today. Instead, there were a hundred competing clans, each 
with its own territorial lord. And over all lay the shadow of 
Western aggression, dictating speed and more speed. 
TACKLING THE PROBLEM 
From ~he outset of the Meiji .era, anti-foreignism was dropped. 
Emperor Meiji's famous Charter Oath (April 6, 1868) con-
tained this statement: "Knowledge and learning shall be sought 
for throughout the world in order to establish the founda-
tions of the Empire." 
A period of borrowing from the West, comparable only to 
the earlier imitation of China, set in. One after another, Japa-
nese official missions were sent abroad. Foreign advisers-
British, French, Dutch, German, American-were employed in 
many different fields. Large numbers of Japanese students 
entered the universities of Western countries. F or a short 
time imitation of the West went to extremes; in many externals, 
Western ways became a fad. On the whole, however, there 
was strict control over the process of borrowing, and careful 
adaptation to Japanese needs. 
In keeping with Japan's traditions, a limited group main-
tained firm and despotic power at all times. The Meiji political 
reforms clothed old ideas of government in new garments. 
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Emperor Meiji (1868-1912) reigned again, and with some 
degree of authority. But actual power during his long reign 
lay in the hands of the small group of men who surrounded 
him. There was no thoroughgoing mass upheaval, forcing 
recognition of popular rights. Reforms were dictated from the 
top down. 
THREE NEW TRENDS 
The great changes which occurred during the Meiji era may 
be grouped under three main headings. There were, in the first 
place, the economic reforms which merged the old feudal 
lords and samurai into a new society, and laid the foundations 
of Japan's modern industries. Then, there was a political move-
ment which led finally to the Emperor's proclamation of a writ-
ten constitution. Finally, there was a cautious development of 
foreign policy by which Japan, at first on the defensive, later 
embarked on an expansionist program and fought its wars 
with China and Russia. In this chapter we shall look at the 
first of these trends. 
ABOLITION OF FEUDAL RIGHTS 
Between 1868 and 1877 a series of basic reforms gave cen-
tralized control to the Imperial government. Th~ four west-
ern clans returned their lands to the Emperor, thus enabling 
him to order the other clans to do the same. In this way the 
government took over the land taxes, the main source of 
revenue. But the lords, though they no longer held the land 
registers, were still political rulers in their feudal domains. 
So, in 1871, an Imperial decree established prefectures, with 
Imperial governors, in place of the old clan divisions. Finally, 
the feudal lords lost their private armies. At first, the Imperial 
government's army consisted mainly of the military forces of 
the western clan.s. By 1873, however, the government was able 
to enforce a system of universal military service, and thus build 
up a national conscript army under its own absolute control. 
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Why, you ask, did the feudal lords accept so easily this 
rapid loss of their former powers? In large part, it was a result 
{)f the lead taken by the western clans, whose samurai statesmen 
held the reins in the Imperial governmept. For they were pre-
pared to back the new measures with military action, if neces-
sary. But a second factor was equally important. The clan lords, 
especially the great daimyo, were well paid for the surrender 
of their old privileges. Their lands were not confiscated out-
right. Large annual grants of money were allotted them out 
of central revenues. But the payments originally promised in 
this huge pension scheme turned out to be too heavy for the 
central treasury to meet. The government therefore first re-
duced the pensions and then, in 1876, compulsorily ended them 
by means of lump-sum payments, in cash or short-term bonds. 
Though this drastic scaling down of the original pension 
scheme amounted to repudiating its earlier promises, the gov-
ernment had no other way of avoiding bankruptcy. As it was, 
the total cost of commuting the pensions came to nearly 2 I I 
million yen-a large sum for that period. In many respects, this 
way of dealing with the pensions laid the basis of the new 
Japanese society which has since developed. 
LORDS INTO CAPITALISTS 
The daimyo, or great feudal lords, did not fare so badly in the 
financial settlement of 1876. They were relieved of all their 
debts, and of their previous obligations to support their mili-
tary retainers, the samurai. They retained great slices of their 
former lands, which they now held as private owners-that is, 
with fewer responsibilities. Moreover, they acquired large sums 
of money when the pensions were commuted. These sums 
they invested in banks, stocks and industries, as well as in 
landed estates. The daimyo were thus merged into the new 
society, no longer as territorial rulers but as wealthy financial 
magnates, controlling the economic life of the countryside. 
So, from their own point of view, commutation of the pen-
sions was a master-stroke by Japan's new rulers. It helped to 
throw caste distinctions of the old feudal type into the melting 
pot. It won the allegiance of the clan lords to the new order 
simply by making allegiance worth their while. 
THE LOT OF THE SAMURAI 
But in other respects this bold reform created a number of 
serious difficulties. The samurai class as a whole was plunged 
into great distress. A few of them, especially those from the 
western clans, immediately won high positions in the new gov-
ernment. But most of them were left to sink or swim in a 
strange new world. Their small pension payments soon drib-
bled away, and it was hard for them to find means of sup-
port. They had other grievances. A law of 1877 forbade them 
to wear their two swords-traditional mark of honor of the 
santurai class. 1877, too, was the year when the samurai were 
replaced by the new conscript army. During this critical year 
a serious military revolt, centering in Satsuma but joined by all 
the forces opposed to the new order, broke out. It was crushed 
by the Imperial government's new army, made up largely of 
commoners and partly modernized. Thus the last challenge 
to the new order was defeated. 
HARD TIMES FOR THE PEASANTS 
The peasants had an even harder time than the samurai. 
Many local peasant revolts took place in the years up to 
1877. Imperial forces suppressed them, and so prevented the 
peasants from indulging in mass confiscations of lands. 
Yet great changes were taking place. For the peasants were 
no longer feudal serfs. They became landholders, and they 
could serve in the army. But the individual peasant secured 
only a very small plot of land. As a private owner, his situa-
tion was most precarious. He had to face the risks of drought 
42 
or flood, pay taxes in money instead of rice, and cope with 
price changes in the market. His land soon had to be mortgaged, 
and could then be taken away by foreclosure. Indeed, many 
peasants quickly lost their lands in the early years of the new 
order. By 1892 nearly 40 per cent of the total cultivated area 
was worked by tenants. This proportion has persisted, while the 
number of part-tenants has increased. 
Japanese agriculture, moreover, remained backward in tech-
nique and social organization. The landlords became parasites. 
Instead of working the land as a capitalist enterprise for profit, 
they were intent only on drawing high rents-often as much as 
60 per cent. This system had far-reaching effects on Japan. 
As the number of tenants grew, and the land became divided 
into smaller and smaller plots, the farm areas in Japan became 
overpopulated. Only a part of the unneeded farm workers 
could find a place in industry. Competing for jobs, they kept 
wages low. Low wages, of course, were a boon to industrial 
development. But what industry gained in one way it lost in 
another. For the farmers and the workers were too poor to 
buy much. The country's purchasing power grew only very 
slowly. Thus the home market for factory products was lim-
ited, and industry did not develop as fast as it might otherwise 
have done. Very early Japan's new factory industries had 
to turn to the foreign market. As the limitations on Japan's 
home market have persisted down to the present time, the 
pressure for foreign trade expansion has grown steadily more 
urgent. Here is one underlying cause for Japan's current policy 
of military expansion. 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
But changes in agriculture, as we have seen, did help to make 
possible the growth of a modern Japanese industry. Peasants 
who lost their lands, or artisans thrown out of work, became 
available as factory workers. Here was industry's labor force. 
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Many other changes helped industry along. Foreign trade, 
long prohibited, had begun to grow rapidly in the 'sixties. Clan 
barriers to internal trade were leveled. ,Hundreds of different 
kinds of money, issued by the various clans, had circulated. 
These were now abolished, and a single national currency 
instituted. Railways were built, and telephone and telegraph 
systems laid down. These improvements made a freer sale and 
exchange of goods throughout the country possible. Thus a 
home market-even if a very limited one-was established. 
, For the introduction of modern, large-scale industry, how-
ever, two further things were needed-technique and capital. 
Foreign experts, acting both as direct advisers in industry and 
as instructors in the new technical schools, provided the first 
of these requireme,nts. The second was harder to fill. The bank-
ing-trader houses and the pensioned-off lords had some capital. 
But it was not enough to finance the big factory projects, 
especially where quick profits seemed unlikely. So the Imperial 
government had to step in and supply the capital in most of 
the larger enterprises. It paid special attention to the arma-
ment industries-mining, metallurgy, shipbuilding. 
NURSING INFANT INDUSTRIES 
The clan bureaucrats in the government nursed the construc-
tion of this new industrial plant with extreme care and pride. 
Many of them fell in love with machinery and engineering 
technique. They worked closely with the great business houses, 
grafting industry on to firms that had been mainly concerned 
with trade or banking. The budding capitalists were not finan-
cially strong enough to develop industry by themselves. So 
the clan statesmen took them into partnership. It was the clan 
statesmen, however, who headed the combination-an im-
portant factor in Japan's political gr~wth, then and later. 
But the clansmen did not wish to keep all industry under 
govemment control. They only wanted to see that it developed 
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quickly. Then the businessmen could handle it, or at least 
all but the strategic industries. The government kept control 
of railways, telephones, telegraphs, arsenals and naval ship-
yards. But in the case of many other industries, it supplied 
the capital and started their development, then turned them 
back to the great business houses, often at very low prices. 
In this way the capitalists were spoon-fed by the government. 
l\1itsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and other houses obtained ready-
made facilities in many fields-cotton-spinning mills, glass and 
cement factories, mining enterprises, shipyards. The giant Mit-
subishi monopoly in commercial shipping, for example, got its 
start through the gift and cheap purchase of government 
vessels. 
By 1890 some 200 steam factories were in operation in 
Japan. The development of a I machine industry was making 
good headway. 
VII. Who Rules Modern Japan? 
Weare now able to distinguish the main groups which were to 
rule the modern Japanese Empire. Within the quarter century 
from 1853 to 1877 a new leadership had emerged. 
True to japan's history and tr~dition, control was concen-
trated in a few hands. The ruling group was composed of the 
clan leaders, dominating the government bureaucracy (since 
grown to nearly 500,000 office holders); the old feudal lords 
with great landed estates; and the business group-bankers, 
traders and industrialists. 
HAND IN GLOVE 
At the head of this partnership were the clan leaders, and a 
few representatives of the old court nobility. The clan bureau-
crats, as they came to be called, held the influential posts in 
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the new Imperial government. To a large extent, their dic-
tatorial powers carried on the old feudal tradition. Many of 
them were civilians, but they also controlled the army (Choshu) 
and the navy (Satsuma). The business people, on the other 
hand, especially in the beginning, were definitely in a sub-
ordinate position. It was the government which controlled 
most of the early industrial enterprises, as we have seen. Not 
until much later, after the World War of 1914-18, did trade 
and industry reach a size which enabled the capitalists to 
make themselves felt politically. 
It was the existence of the "upper crust" and the inferior 
status of business that largely determined the charac!er of 
the new political institutions established during the Meiji era. 
They were designed, it is true, to serve the purposes of the 
whole combination of ruling groups. But at the same time 
the clan bureaucrats took good care to set up the machinery 
they needed to perpetuate their own supremacy. 
CONSERVATIVES VS. LIBERALS 
For a decade after the Restoration of 1868, an outright dic-
tatorship functioned in Japan. The powers of the clansmen 
were almost unlimited. Within the ruling group itself, however, 
there were wide differences of opinion on some points. One 
important question was what institutional forms the new gov-
ernment should adopt. Headed by Itagaki (a T osa samurai), the 
more liberal reformers wanted to set up a fully representative 
government modeled on the advanced Western democracies. 
But most of the clansmen opposed such a radical step. In the 
end, however, the conservatives accepted the necessity of a 
written constitution-which they drew up themselves. 
Even this concession was made grudgingly, and only after 
it had become absolutely necessary. But several factors worked 
in favor of the liberals. The ,prestige of Western institutions 
was high at this period. An article in the Emperor's Charter 
46 
Oath, moreover, was interpreted as a pledge to inaugurate a 
"deliberative assembly." Quoting this pledge, the liberals 
started a political campaign which won considerable support. 
Finally, the rising capitalists needed a representative system in 
order to secure a real voice in the government. Despite all 
these advantages, in the end the liberals were outmaneuvered 
in the political arena. They obtained a constitution, it is true, 
but one which was written and imposed by the conserva-
tive clansmen. The result was not a democratic Bill of Rights 
but a highly autocratic document. With but few exceptions, the 
liberals' failure ' at this time was characteristic of Japan's later 
history. 
THE LIBERALS LOSE 
The political struggle reached its climax in the second decade 
after the Restoration. In the press and on the public platform, 
the liberals waged their campaign. In 1878 they succeeded in 
getting provincial assemblies with limited powers, and in 
1880 local (town, city and village) assemblies. In 188 I, riots 
followed the exposure of graft in the central administration. 
To save their position, the conservatives had the Emperor issue 
a declaration promising a National Assembly in 189o-nine 
years ahead. 
But the political struggle did not abate. It now turned on 
what should be the terms of the constitution which was to 
establish the elective assembly. The conservatives meanwhile 
took strong measures against the opposition. They strictly 
enforced laws curbing the press. They suppressed Itagaki's 
political party in 1884. In 1887 martial law was proclaimed in 
Tokyo, and the opposition leaders were driven from the capital. 
In this way the conservative bureaucrats got a free hand in 
drafting the new constitution and putting it over. 
Hirobumi Ito, its main architect, had gone abroad in 1882 to 
study Western constitutional practices. He was greatly Im-
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pressed by Bismarck, and took the Prussian Constitution as his 
model. First, certain preparatory changes were made. A 
nobility of five orders was established in 1884, and a Cabinet 
in 1885. A civil service was started, and in 1887 a Supreme 
War Council was set up to advise the Emperor on military 
and naval affairs. In 1888 Ito became president of the Privy 
Council, which was given authority to revise the draft consti-
tution he had prepared. Ito's work of framing the document 
was carried out "in absolute ' secrecy." After it had been read 
in private to a small group of officials, the Emperor promul-
gated the new constitution on February I I, 1889. The first elec-
tions to the Imperial Diet were held in 1890. 
A GIFT OF THE EMPEROR 
The Constitution was a "gift" of the Emperor. It was not 
intended to' establish popular government. Its preamble empha-
sized the old theocratic (priest-king) traditions of Japan. 
The Emperor "inherited" the right to rule "from Our Ances-
tors," and ruled "in lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal." 
Ito and his colleagues not only incorporated these traditional 
ideas into the Constitution. They made them the cornerstone 
of the new system of universal education, and thus instilled 
them in the mass of the Japanese people. Reverence for the 
Emperor as a divine ruler helped enormously to keep the new 
regime solidly in place. 
Practically all the government's powers, both civil and mili-
tary, were vested in the Emperor. \T ast economic power 
bolstered his political authority . No longer, as on occasion in 
feudal times, could the Emperor become penniless. For court 
expenses, the Imperial Family receives an annual grant of 
4,500,000 yen (more than a million dollars). Its holdings in 
lands and blocks of shares, estimated at over one billion yen, 
provide a large additional income. So it is one of the wealthiest 
families in Japan. 
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JAPAN'S RULING SYSTEM 
THE GOVERNMENT UNDER ITO'S CONSTITUTION 
PRIVY COUNCIL 
'" t" 
THE EMPEROR MUST BE "CONSTITUTIONAL" 
The Emperor's powers are exercised on the advice of his 
ministers, in accordance with constitutional practic~. He is not 
supposed to act on his o"vn authority. Real power, therefore, 
resides not in the Emperor but in his advisers, acting through 
the agencies set up by the Constitution. On the surface, these 
agencies seem to establish a systenl of representative govern-
ment. There is a Cabinet, and a Diet with two houses-the 
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House of Peers and the House of Representatives. And political 
parties like those of the Western democracies soon formed to 
contest elections in Japan. 
But there the resemblance ends. There is not only the sup-
posedly divine power of the Emperor. The democratic forms 
themselves are a shell, empty of the real meat of popular 
government. In all effective representative systems, as· we well 
know, the legislature-particularly its lower house-has real 
authority. Not so under Ito's Constitution. Ito ranged an over-
whelming battery of aristocratic, bureaucratic and militarist 
influence in five powerful agencies of government. You can see 
from our chart on page 49 what these agencies were. They 
completely eclipsed the House of Representatives. Moreover, 
they often dominated the Cabinet, or disputed its authority. 
And through them, as much as through the Cabinet, the clans-
men ruled Japan with a tight rein. Let us see how each worked 
out in practice. 
NON-POPULAR AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT 
First, there were the Elder Statesmen (or Genro). They were a 
body completely outside the Constitution. Survivors of the 
early Meiji clansmen, they had prestige and experience. For 
several decades after 1900 they held the government in the hol-
low of their hands. They made and unmade Cabinets, shuffied 
the Premiership among themselves, decided on war and peace. 
Their last representative, Prince Saionji, died in November 
1940 at the age of 92. ·So from now on there will be no more 
Genro to be reckoned with. 
Next comes the Imperial Household Ministry. Two officials 
here occupy key positions. The Lord Keeper of the Privy 
Seal holds the seals which must be affixed to state documents. 
And the Minister of the Imperial Household has charge of 
matters connected with the Imperial Family. These men are 
not only themselves powerful advisers of the Emperor. But 
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appointments to see the Emperor must be made through them. 
So at times they have been able to bar their political opponents 
from reaching the Imperial ear. Usually they hold office for · 
life or until they wish to resign. 
The Privy Council is likewise a useful piece of machinery 
for Japan's ruling group. It is the supreme advisory body to 
the Emperor. It consists of 26 life members, usually of great 
age. Cabinet Ministers serve as members of the Council ex-
officio, but are outvoted by at least two to one. Among other 
things, the Privy Council ratifies treaties, approves amendments 
to the Constitution, and passes on Imperial ordinances. 
The House of Peers consists of about 400 members, of whom 
more than 200 are drawn from the nobility, 125 are life ap-
pointees, and nearly 70 are elected from the largest taxpayers. 
It is an extremely aristocratic and conservative body. Yet its 
powers equal those of the lower house. And its members can 
become Premiers or Cabinet Ministers. 
Lastly, the Army and Navy, with their General Staffs and 
their representatives on the Supreme War Council, are largely 
independent of civilian control. The chiefs of the General 
Staffs and the War and Navy Ministers have direct access to 
the Emperor. This means that they can go over the Premier's 
head to appeal any decision of his to the Emperor. The War 
and Navy Ministers cannot be civilians. They must be ranking 
officers in active service. Since they are nominated by the 
Supreme War Council, the latter body can overthrow a Cabinet 
by simply ordering them to resign. Or it can prevent the forma-
tion of a new Cabinet which it does not like by refusing to 
offer nominations for the War and Navy Ministries. 
THE PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES 
As against these aristocratic, bureaucratic and military organs 
of government, the popular will can be expressed only through 
the House of Representatives. The position of the House is 
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-very weak, especially in comparison with the normal legisla-
ture of a full-fledged democracy. 
For Ito saw fit to curb the powers of the Diet's lower house 
by a series of drastic restrictions. Large fixed, or non-votable, 
expenditures limit its control over the public purse. If appro-
priations are not voted, the Cabinet has the right to enforce 
the preceding year's budget. Most bills are introduced not by 
Diet members but by the Cabinet, which also possesses an 
absolute veto. Moreover, the Cabinet can issue Imperial ordi-
nances which, with few qualifications, have the . force of law. 
It can dissolve the lower house, and thus force an election-
an expensive proceeding for the deputies. And for several 
decades only part of the people could vote. Not until 1925 was 
full manhood suffrage (age 25) adopted. During elections the 
Home Ministry has often intimidated the voters. And popular 
rights are further curbed by a controlled press, a strong cen-
tralized police force, a large degree of central domination of 
local government, and the possibility that one may be arrested 
and held indefinitely without trial (because Japan has no habeas 
corpus law). 
The development of a Cabinet with independent power, 
responsible to the lower house of the Diet, would seem im-
possible under these circumstances. Entrenched positions were 
held by the aristocrats, the bureaucrats and the militarists. 
F or if they did not control the Cabinet, always a necessary 
citadel of power, they could be sure of bringing about its 
downfall. A responsible Cabinet did emerge in the post-war 
years. But, as we shall see, this period was short-lived. After 
1930, largely through the pressure , of the militarists, the 
pendulum swung back. 
VIII. Creating a Modern Empire 
By 1890, when the first Diet elections were held, the founda-
tions of a new Empire had been laid. In the few short years 
·since 1868, the old feudal society had undergone a profound 
change. Agriculture was still the key to Japan's economy, 
but factory industry and foreign trade were growing in im-
portance. A strong centralized state had come into being. 
Modern methods were revolutionizing science, education, 
medicine, law and many other fields. There was an army re-
cruited through universal service and trained in Western ways, 
and the beginnings of a modern navy. 
JAPAN LOOKS ABROAD 
The Meiji statesmen were now ready to turn their attention' 
to foreign policy. Even before the Restoration many of the 
Japanese leaders had favored territorial expansion. During the 
years of internal reform, however, they had cautiously re-
frained from rash adventures abroad. A strong movement in 
favor of a punitive expedition to Korea had developed in 1871-
73, but the dominant clan bureaucrats had skilfully prevented 
the outbreak of war. They had permitted a Formosan expedi-
tion in 1874, but had settled the resulting issues peacefully 
"\vith China. Some small gains had been made. The Bonin 
Islands were annexed in 1876, and the Liuchiu Islands in 1879. 
A naval demonstration in 1876 secured to Japan special treaty 
rights in Korea, which led to more and more intervention in 
Korean affairs. 
But these were not the foreign problems which chiefly 
occupied the early Meiji leaders. First and foremost, they were 
trying to change the unequal treaties concluded with the 
Western powers at the end of the Tokl1gawa period. These 
treaties, you will remember, permitted Western nationals to 
be tried in their own consular courts (the system of extraterri-
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toriality), and fixed Japan's tariff at the low rate of 5 per cent. 
The struggle to throw off these irksome restrictions was the 
central issue in Japan's foreign relations down to 1894. 
FIGHTING THE UNEQUAL TREATIES 
The Japanese made many efforts to regain control of both 
tariffs and courts before they finally won success. An official 
mission under Prince I"vakura toured Western capitals in 1871-
7 3 but failed to gain treaty revision. As other attempts also came 
to nothing, an intense popular resentment developed in Japan. 
In 1889, just when his negotiations for treaty revision were 
progressing favorably, a bomb tore off Count Okuma's leg. 
Success was not won, however, until a new treaty was con-
cluded with Great Britain on July 16, 1894. The other powers 
soon followed suit. Japan's law courts had been modernized, 
and she now enforced new civil, commercial and criminal 
codes. In 1899, when the new treaties went into effect, all 
Westerners became subject to Japanese law. These treaties 
thus brought the extraterritorial system to an end. But they 
all contained tariff schedules that lasted for 12 years, so that 
Japan did not secure full control over her own tariffs until 
the treaties expired in 191 I. 
WAR WITH CHINA 
On July 25, 1894, nine days after signature of the "equal" 
treaty with Great Britain, Japanese naval forces suddenly 
attacked and sank a transport carrying Chinese troops to 
Korea. War was formally declared on August I. Thus, by an 
unusual coincidence, Japan was at war with China two weeks 
after she had won her twenty-five-year campaign for treaty 
reVISIon. 
Japan's statesmen had correctly estimated the weakness of 
China, as well as their own degree of preparedness. They did 
not plunge into war on a hasty impulse. The army and navy 
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were tuned for action. With harsh realism, the Japanese leaders 
unhesitatingly adopted a program of expansion by force as 
soon as conditions seemed favorable. Their fight for treaty 
revision had been a fight for equality with the Western powers. 
They believed that even fuller recognition of equality would 
come after a successful war. They were also driven by strong 
economic considerations. The restrictions of the narrow home 
market were already irking Japan's youthful cotton textile 
export houses, and they were trying to pry their way into the 
Korean and Chinese markets. Victory in the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1894-95 opened both these markets to Japanese manu-
facturers. It was a significant omen of the future that the new 
Japan should have discovered, so early in its career, that resort 
to the s"\vord might help to overcome the handicaps of its late 
appearance on the international scene. 
We should also take note of several other results of Japan's 
first nlodern war. The territorial gains-Formosa and the Pesca-
dores Islands-were a welcome prize. More important was 
China's formal recognition of Korean independence, which left 
Japan practically a free hand in the peninsula. By its new 
commercial treaty with China, Japan also gained the benefits 
of extraterritoriality and low tariff rates in that country-the 
system she hated so heartily when it was applied against her-
self, as it still was at that time. The war indemnity of nearly 
$180,000,000, moreover, helped Japan to expand its armaments 
still further in preparation for the war with Russia in 19°4. 
THUS FAR AND NO FARTHER 
An episode which heightened Japan's senSItIveness in her 
foreign relations marked the peace settlement. In the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki, China had agreed to cede Japan the Liaotung 
Peninsula in South Manchuria. Germany, Russia and France 
objected to this territorial cession, and backed their objections 
by an ultimatum to Tokyo threatening war. Japan was forced 
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to submit, and in exchange for a slight increase in the indem-
nity, the territory was returned to China. More than the pre-
Restoration bombardments of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, 
more even than the galling yoke of the unequal treaties, this 
"tripartite intervention" rankled in Japanese hearts. This sense 
of humiliation was not lessened in 1898, when Russia secured 
from China a 25-year lease of the southern tip of the disputed 
Liaotung Peninsula and proceeded to fortify Port Arthur and 
join Harbin to Dairen by a new railway line. 
WAR WITH RUSSIA 
On the whole, however, the gains of the war had proved suffi-
cient to justify the calculations of Japan's leaders, and to 
strengthen the forces within Japan that were working toward 
expansion. In 1900 Japan took part as an equal with the West-
ern powers in quelling the famous Boxer Uprising in China, 
and shared in the returns from the Boxer Indemnity which they 
later imposed as a punishment on the Chinese. The fact that 
the British thought it worth while to sign an alliance with 
Japan in 1902 was an additional testimony to her growing 
prestige. Fortified by this alliance, and by strenuous efforts 
to build up her military and naval forces, Japan emerged suc-
cessfully from her clash with Tsarist Russia in 1904-05. 
The peace terms did not include the indemnity Japan cov-
eted, largely because she was too exhausted to continue the 
struggle. But still there were substantial gains. Japan won a pro-
tectorate over Korea, which she converted to full annexation in 
1910. The Russian leasehold at the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula 
was transferred to Japan, and also the Russian railway lines in 
South Manchuria. Finally, Russia ceded the southern half of 
Sakhalin Island to Japan, and granted important fishing rights 
in northern Pacific waters to Japanese interests. 
The Treaty of Portsmouth, which set forth these terms and 
in which President Theodore Roosevelt mediated, established 
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Japan as the rising power in the Far East. In 1905, three weeks 
before the treaty was signed, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was 
extended for ten years, with provisions sanctioning Japan's 
paramount interests in Korea. 
END OF THE MEIJI ERA 
In the decade spanned by the two wars, Japan had forged 
rapidly ahead in her economic development. Her foreign trade, 
which totaled only 265 million yen in 1895, had jumped to 810 
million in 1905 (see chart, page 61). Her steam shipping had 
shown an even more extraordinary spurt-from 15,000 tons in 
1893 to 1,552,000 tons in 1905. 
On the political side, the new constitution worked out pretty 
much as the clan statesmen had expected. For a short time the 
bureaucrats had some difficulty with the Diet, where a liberal 
opposition threatened to develop. But they soon checked this 
tendency. They intimidated or bought off opposition leaders. 
They embarked on a policy of war and expansion-which the 
liberals supported. And, eventually, they organized parties 
headed by members of the bureaucracy itself-in the :first 
instance, Prince Ito. 
The Meiji Emperor died on July 30, 1912. During his long 
reign of nearly 45 years, all the great changes which we have 
been considering had taken place. From a weak feudal state, 
Japan had been transformed into a great power. Two years 
after Emperor Meiji's passing, the outbreak of the World War 
ushered in a period of still more ambitious expansion and 
growth. 
IX. Japan and the First World War 
The World War gave Japan her great opportunity, which her 
leaders were quick to seize. The conditions created by W orId 
War No. 1 might have been made to order for Japan. They 
brought all her strategic advantages into play, and were ideally 
adapted to meet her economic necessities. 
Japan was not compelled to fight a full-dress war. The 
Western powers were more than occupied on the European 
battlefields, so Japan was given pretty much of a free hand 
in the Far East. And the line-up of powers in 1914-18 added 
greatly to the strategic advantage of her geographic location. 
Britain and Russia were Japan's allies from the outset, while the 
United States could not offer firm opposition to Japanese ex-
pansion. Thus Japan was able to achieve a great deal with 
very little effort. 
Conditions on the economic side were no less favorable. 
As Japan's military and naval operations during the war were 
relatively slight, the costs were small. On the other hand, her 
economic gains were exceedingly large. For next to the United 
States, Japan was the greatest supplier of the warring nations. 
MAKING HAY WHILE THE SUN SHINES 
It was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, renewed for the third 
time in 191 I, which gave Japan formal diplomatic cause for 
entering the war. On August 23, 1914 she declared war on 
Germany. 
Mter a brief struggle, the German forces at the leasehold 
of Tsingtao, in Shantung province, surrendered on November 
7. A month later the whole of Shantung province was in 
Japanese hands. Then followed the famous Twenty-One De-
mands on China. On May 25, 1915, at the point of a gun, 
China signed treaties and notes incorporating many of these 
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Twenty-One Demands. Among other things these treaties 
confirmed japan's newly won position in Shantung province, 
and extended her rail"vay and territorial rights in South Man-
churia to the end of the century. American protests helped 
to block the most sweeping demands, which would have made 
China a Japanese protectorate. l\1eanwhile the Japanese navy 
had scoured the Pacific, and had occupied all the German 
islands north of the equator. 
THE SECRET TREATIES OF 1917 
During the early months of 1917, Japan turned to diplomacy in 
order to be sure that she would be able to keep her territorial 
gains after the war. The United States had not yet entered the 
war, and the military fortunes of the Allied powers in Europe 
were at a low ebb. iVIaking good use of this situation, Japan 
negotiated secret treaties with Britain, France, Russia and 
Italy. Signed in February and March 1917, these agreements 
pledged that Japan's claims to the German islands north of 
the equator and to the former German rights in Shantung 
would be supported at the peace conference. But the Japanese 
did not secure American support of these claims. In the Lansing-
Ishii agreement of November 2, 1917, the United States offered 
merely a qualified recognition of Japan's "special interests in 
China." 
The secret treaties with the Allied powers were shrewdly 
drawn and enabled Japan to come off victorious at the Paris 
Peace Conference. Her newly established position in Shan-
tung province, as well as the extensions of her rights in South 
Manchuria, were accepted and written into the Versailles 
Treaty. The German islands north of the equator were 
awarded Japan as a Class C mandate, the kind of mandate 
which came closest to annexation. American opposition to these 
decisions cut no ice, mainly because of Japan's secret agree-
ments with the Allies. On only one big issue was Japan de-
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HOW 'JAPAN'S FOREIGN TRADE HAS GROWN 
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feated at the conference. Her statesmen had demanded that 
a clause on racial equality be inserted in the peace treaty. 
This demand was rej ected, largely because the Western powers 
were afraid that it would let down the bars against Japanese 
immigration to their countries. 
FLIES IN THE OINTMENT 
But despite the acceptance of her territorial gains at the peace 
conference, by 1919 Japan's difficulties were increasing. A 
student uprising in Peking drove out the pro-Japanese Anfu 
clique that had controlled the Chinese government. Opposition 
to the Shantung award was growing in the United States, and 
the American navy was rapidly becoming the most powerful 
in the world. Two years later Japan's position had become still 
weaker. A boycott was severely reducing Japanese trade in 
China. The costs of the naval-building race with the United 
States were a heavy burden. Japanese intervention in Siberia, 
which continued after the armed forces of the Western powers 
had been withdrawn, was not succeeding. And expenditure on 
the Siberian occupation, ultimately totaling about 800 million 
yen, together with the naval-building costs, was straining the 
Japanese budget. These various factors were discrediting the 
Japanese militarists at home, and liberal Japanese ':Vere be-
ginning to speak out against them 
SLOWING DOWN JAPAN'S DRIVE 
Under these conditions, the United States was able to summon 
the Washington Conference, at which important agreements 
on naval limitation and Pacific questions were reached early 
in 1922. By accepting a battleship ratio of 3 tons as against 
5 each for Britain and the United States, Japan was relieved 
of the costs of the naval race. Her security in Far Eastern 
waters was further increased by the provision restricting forti-
fication of island bases in the Pacific. The F our-Power Pact, 
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signed by Britain, France, the u. S. and Japan, and pledging 
respect for insular possessions in the Pacific, replaced the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
In return for these contributions to her security in Far East-
ern waters, Japan made a number of important concessions. 
By an agreement with China, she restored Shantung province 
to Chinese control. Japan also signed the Nine-Power Treaty, 
which pledged all its signatories to respect China's territorial 
and administrative integrity and the "open door" -or equal 
commercial opportunity for all nations-in China. 
In later days, some of the provisions of these Washington 
Conference agreements came to be bitterly attacked in Japan, 
especially by military and naval extremists. It is an open ques-
tion as to how far these criticisms were justified. It was chiefly 
the effectiveness of the Chinese boycott that forced the restora-
tion of Shantung province. Japan's major concession was in 
the Nine-Power Treaty, by which she agreed to lay down the 
sword and accept the results of peaceful commercial competi-
tion in China. But there was no machinery provided to enforce 
this treaty. The naval limitation treaty relieved Japan of the 
heavy costs of the 192 I naval race and at the same time, even 
under the 5-5-3 ratio, left her able to dominate the China coast. 
She was thus in a strategic position to renew her expansionist 
program-which she did in 193 I. 
WORLD WAR GAINS 
Moreover, the W orld War settlement for Japan, as finally 
reached at Washington, was no empty achievement. Japan had 
not obtained her larger ambitions in China or Siberia, it is true. 
But the former German islands north of the equator-of great 
strategic, if not economic, importance-were now a Japanese 
mandate. Japan's rights in South Manchuria had become much 
more firmly established. Her naval and commercial fleets had 
greatly expanded, she occupied a permanent seat on the Co un-
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cll of the League of Nations, and she was recognized as one 
of the half-dozen Great Powers. Japan had also made important 
economic gains, to w~ich we must now tum our attention. 
THE WAR BOOM 
It was ' in the economic field, perhaps, that Japan reaped her 
greatest gains from the World War. For her shops and factories 
were kept busy supplying the belligerent countries, their 
colonial populations, and the American market. Her allies con-
trolled the seas, and Japanese ships sailed all of them. This free-
dom of the seas was an important factor for Japan, who had 
become increasingly dependent on international trade. 
Japan's war boom was, in many respects, very similar to that 
enjoyed by the United States. The relative increase in trade 
was even greater. Between 1914 and 1920 Japan's total foreign 
trade increased from 1,187 million yen to 4,285 million, or by 
nearly four times (see chart, page 61). Through 1918, more-
over, exports increased much faster than imports. For Japan 
this meant a chance to stock up on her reserves of gold and 
foreign currencies, which had always been low. In the 1914-18 
period, exports outran imports by 1,460 million yen. This fig-
ure contrasted with an import excess of 1,158 million yen dur-
ing the preceding 20 years. 
What we have said so far applies only to trade in goods. But 
returns on invisible trade items, such as shipping services, were 
also high-totaling more than 1,500 million yen for the 1914-18 
period. The wartime balances for both types of trade came to 
more than 3,000 million yen-on the right side of the ledger. 
As a result, Japan's financial reserves greatly increased. Exten-
sive loans and investments were made in foreign countries, and 
large holdings in gold and foreign exchange were piled up. 
Japan emerged from the war stronger financially and eco-
nomically than she had ever been before. Nevertheless, she was 
to suffer a series of economic setbacks in the post-war period. 
x. Go Liberal, Go Fascist? 
Even before the war ended, there had been signs of economic 
distress within Japan. While the profits from the war boom 
were going into the pockets of a small group, a sharp rise in 
the cost of living had caused suffering among the masses of the 
people. Speculators were profiteering in rice, which soared 
from 20 or 25 yen to more than 50 yen on the five-bushel unit. 
In the summer of 1918 there were serious "rice riots," and 
troops were called out to suppress the demonstrations. During 
the war, moreover, trade union and socialist ideas had taken 
root in Japan, paving the way for the growth of labor unions 
and left-:-wing parties in the post-war years. 
UPS AND DOWNS 
Then came the world slump in 1920-2 I, which led to a sudden 
collapse of Japan's war boom. Partial recovery had no sooner 
set in than it received a sharp jolt from the disastrous earth-
quake of 1923 . To meet these setbacks, Japan drew heavily 
on the financial reserves accumulated during the war. Recon-
struction after the earthquake created another short-lived boom 
-ended by a bank panic in 1927. 
Despite post-war difficulties, however, Japan managed to 
keep her industry on the up grade. The great advances made 
during the war were maintained and consolidated. In the post-
war slump the number of factory workers had declined, but 
in 1927-28 they reached the wartime level of 2,000,000 again. 
Throughout the 'twenties, except for a sharp drop in 1921, 
Japan's total foreign trade continued to hold the new average 
level of 4,000 million yen. Population leaped forward, from 
about 50 million persons in 1914 to 56 million in 1920, and to 
nearly 65 million in 1930 (see chart, page 69). 
BIG BUSINESS TO THE FORE 
During and after the war, Japan's business groups had come 
of age. They were no longer subordinate to the other ruling 
forces in the state. Japan's effort to overtake the West, as we 
noticed, had led to a close tie-up between government and 
industry. This relationship had made it easy for Japan's great 
business houses to become monopolies. From the beginning 
they had united banking, trade and industry under one roof. 
Post-war developments, such as the financial crisis of 1927, had 
carried the process of financial concentration beyond even 
what was characteristic of Western countries. By this time 
half-a-dozen of Japan's huge family combines, such as Mitsui 
and Mitsubishi, dominated Japanese economy. They had 
become one of the most powerful financial ruling groups in 
the world. 
BUT INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON FOREIGN TRADE 
And here we have to point out the striking paradox in Japan's ' 
new economic society. It was still largely agricultural. In 1925 
more than half the people were dependent on agriculture for 
their livelihood. But the peasants were too poor to buy the 
typical consumption goods (automobiles, for example) that 
were staples in the home markets of Western countries. Thus 
it was impossible for Japan to develop modern factory indus-
tries turning out all lines of consumption goods. Only in cot-
ton textiles, with their special export market, and in shipbuild-
ing and metallurgy, serving the army and navy, were large-
scale factories practical. In 1928 the greater part of Japan's 
manufactured-goods was produced in industrial units employ-
ing ten, five or even fewer workers. Firms like Mitsui and Mit-
subishi, however, contracted for the output of these small-
scale industrial units and then sold it, often in foreign markets. 
Thus Japan, although she had made great strides in some 
lines of industry, had become dangerously dependent on inter-
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ONE.OFJA_PAN'S FAMILY EMPJRES 
On Iy key enterprises wh ich 
supplement one another are 
shown. Mitsui controls many 
others. 
THE HOUSE OF MITSui 
national trade. After 1929, with the onset of the world depres-
sion, the difficulties of this situation were plain to see. Quotas 
and tariffs barred even Japan's low-priced goods. Old sores 
rankled, particularly those affecting immigration. The Exclu-
sion Act, passed by the American Congress over the President's 
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disapproval in 1924, cut the deepest. In fact, it undid most of 
the good effects of the generous aid America gave Japan after 
the earthquake in 1923. 
THE LIBERALS TAKE A HAND 
These post-war years, especially after 192 I, witnessed a brief 
flovvering of parliamentary democracy in Japan. None of the 
architects of the Constitution, least of all Ito, had foreseen this 
possibility. Yet in the late 'twenties it seemed as if the Cabinet 
might win unchallenged power, that party government would 
reign supreme, and that the House of Representatives would 
become the true seat of authority. 
This change came about quite naturally, through the increas-
ing influence of the great business houses. By 1925 the indus-
trialists and the bankers, or their representatives, held many of 
the leading offices which the clansmen had formerly made their 
own. They held the presidency of the Privy Council, and the 
key posts in the Imperial Household Ministry. They were influ-
ential in the House of Peers, in the bureaucracy and even in 
the Army and Navy. Generals and admirals could actually be 
found to support the policies of party governments. All the 
Elder Statesmen except Prince Saionji had died. And even he, 
being related to the Sumitomo banking house, was in sympathy 
with the capitalist outlook. As Prince Saionji was the Emperor's 
chief adviser on the choice of a new Premier, he occupied the 
most strategic position in the state. In the 1925-3 1 period, on 
his nomination, six consecutive governments were formed by 
party Premiers holding majorities in the Diet's lower house. 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Party influence, increasing with the growth of capitalism in 
Japan, reached its height during these years. At an earlier period 
the clan bureaucrats had manipulated the parties to suit them-
selves-usually with little difficulty. But as time passed, the 
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parties formed closer and closer ties with the great business 
houses. Mitsubishi interests were linked with the Minseito 
party, Mitsui with the Seiyukai party. The Election Law was 
gradually amended, increasing the nU111ber of voters, until in 
1925 manhood suffrage was adopted. This change forced Diet 
members to spend large sums in electioneering, and made 
them more dependent on capitalist support. Consequently, it 
strengthened the capitalists' control over the Minseito and the 
Seiyukai. At the same time it made possible the rise of labor 
and left-wing parties, which began to win Diet seats. 













EACH FIGURE = lO.OOO,ooo PERSON"S, 
After 1925 the Cabinets formed by the Minseito and Seiyukai 
parties began to have to account directly to their majorities 
in the House of Representatives for what they did. Parlia-
mentary government was by no means fully established, how-
ever. An adverse vote in the lower house did not, as a rule, 
overthrow these Cabinets. More often they fell because of 
backstage maneuvers in the Privy Council or the House of 
Peers. Nor were their leaders and policies always liberal. For 
a time General Baron Tanaka was president of the Seiyukai. 
He represented the aggressive, militarist wing of the Choshu 
clan. The Seiyukai Cabinet of 1927-29, formed under his 
Premiership, carried out a "positive policy" of military inter-
vention in China. Tanaka had to be a party leader in order to 
become Premier. But his policy showed the strength of old 
tendencies, even in a generally liberal era. 
On the other hand, the succeeding Minseito Cabinet (1929-
3 I) was the strongest and most liberal party government which 
has ever held office in Japan. It came the nearest to establishing 
democracy there. It also had to meet the first onslaught of the 
military-fascist forces that have since become so powerful. In 
"the story of Japan's political development, it thus represents a 
critical turning point of unusual significance. 
SWAN SONG OF THE JAPANESE LIBERALS 
The Minseito Cabinet of 1929-3 I was liberal, but by no means 
radical. It was, in reality, a government of "big business." Its 
liberalism stood out mainly in its moderate foreign policy, 
which contrasted sharply with Tanaka's earlier aggressive 
moves. It was headed by distinguished leaders: Hamaguchi 
(Premier), Shidehara (Foreign Minister) and Inouye (Finance 
Minister). 
This Cabinet labored, however, under a fatal handicap, simi-
lar to that which confronted President Hoover in our own 
country. For it entered office in July 1929, at the height of the 
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post-war boO'm. The Wall Street crash, and the spreading 
WO'rld depression, immediately fO'liowed. The swift change in 
ecO'nO'mic cO'nditiO'ns during its periO'd in O'ffice had' much to' dO' 
with its final O'verthrO'w. 
Hamaguchi and his Cabinet aides began with a great victory 
on the issue of the LO'ndO'n Naval Treaty of 1930'. This treaty 
extended limitatiO'ns to' cruisers and destrO'yers, as well as capi-
tal ships. The army and navy die-hards O'PPO'sed it bitterly. The 
peO'ple and the press SUpPO'rted the Cabinet's fight fO'r it. On 
OctO'ber I, 1930' the Privy CO'uncil ratified the treaty. The 
Cabinet and the peO'ple had wO'n. 
F O'r the mO'ment it seemed as if the Cabinet had brO'ught the 
army and navy under cO'ntrO'I. Real demO'cracy seemed possible. 
But the triumph was shO'rt-lived. It was the swan song O'f parlia-
mentary gO'vernment in Japan. In NO'vember 1930 Premier 
Hamaguchi was shO't by an assassin; eight mO'nths later he died 
from his wounds. His loss seriO'usly weakened the Cabinet, and 
cut dO'wn its chance O'f success O'n new issues which were 
developing. 
, THE DEPRESSION STRIKES JAPAN 
By the end O'f 1930 the depressiO'n had struck Japan with full 
fO'rce. It laid the Cabinet O'pen to' attack by the rising military-
fascist fO'rces. 
The most serious consequences of the depressiO'n were felt 
in Japan's fO'reign trade. In 1929 Japan's export-import trade 
stoO'd at 4,365 milliO'n yen. In 1930' it fell to' 3,0'16 milliO'n, and 
in 1931 to' 2,J83 million. In twO' years Japan's trade was cut 
nearly in half. Even at that periO'd, few Western cO'untries suf-
fered such a rapid and severe cO'ntractiO'n O'f their fO'reign trade .. 
The effects O'f this decline O'n Japan's ecO'nO'my were catas-
trO'phic. Agriculture and industry were , bO'th hard hit. The 
incO'me frO'm rice and silk declined until there was actual famine 
in some rural districts. Industrial unemployment mounted to' 
three million, higher than ever before in Japan. The middle-
class professionals and wage-earners suffered wage cuts, or 
were thrown out of work. There was general social unrest, and 
Marxist doctrines won a wide acceptance. Strikes in industry, 
and tenant conflicts in rural areas, became commonplace. 
In the light of these conditions, the weaknesses of Japan's 
economy stood out in bold relief. Fully half the home ma.~ket 
consisted of poverty-stricken peasants. To put the rt;tral popu-
lation back on its feet and enable it to buy the products of 
industry, drastic social reforms, such as rent reductions and 
debt moratoria for the farmers, were obviously needed. Neither 
the landowners nor the great business houses were prepared to 
embark on such a "new deal." The army had a different solu-
tion-aggressive expansion abroad and military-fascist repres-
sion at home. 
This army program led to a finish fight with the Minseito 
Cabinet. And the army leaders fought-and won-their cam-
paign in Manchuria. 
THE ARMY STRIKES IN MANCHURIA 
The Minseito Cabinet had been trying to pursue a "friendly 
policy" toward China. Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, 
wanted friendly relations with all countries. In this way he 
sought to foster Japan's foreign trade, and thus solve Japan's 
economic problems. But he could not control the army, espe-
cially after the depression had cut down trade and brought 
unrest to Japan. 
During the summer of 193 I a series of "incidents" occurred 
in Manchuria, in which the hand of the military was plainly to 
be seen. At home in Japan the army used these incidents to 
arouse popular support for "positive" action in defense of sup-
posedly threatened Japanese interests. Gen~ral Minami, new 
War Minister in the Cabinet, openly supported this propaganda 
campaign. Baron Shidehara attempted to reach a peaceful 
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settlement of the Manchurian issues. But in vain. On Septem-
ber 18, 193 I~the historic date we mentioned at the beginning 
of this book-the army struck in Manchuria. The "Mukden 
incident" -alleged blowing up of a section of the South Man-
churia Railway track-served as an excuse for the Japanese 
army to occupy the chief Manchurian cities. 
This independent coup d'etat by the army dealt a fatal blow 
to the Minseito Cabinet. Baron Shidehara was forced into the 
position of apologizing for the army's actions, though he must 
have heartily detested them. On December I I, 193 I the Cabinet 
resigned. 
XI. The Shadow Deepens 
The fall of the Minseito Cabinet marked the end of an era. 
The crisis of 1930-3 I had unleashed new forces. And these 
forces were destined to mold Japan's policy in the decade that 
followed. 
At their head was the army. Not all of the army leaders, 
however. At times the "army extremists" seemed to be only a 
small minority. Their power rose and fell. Yet they took com-
mand of Japan's foreign policy, and gained more and more con-
trol over her domestic policy. And as time passed, their outlook 
was increasingly stamped on the army as a whole. 
THE ARMY EXTREMISTS 
Who were the army extremists? Names are not important, 
except as labels of a whole group. There has been no outstand-
ing fascist leader in Japan, such as Mussolini in Italy or Hitler 
in Germany. It is enough for us to note that, in the 1930-32 
period, the high army leadership centered in three generals-
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Araki, Muto and Mazaki. This trio was supported by a power-
ful group of "young officers," such as Doihara . and Itagaki, 
who have since become ranking generals. 
These men were not from the old clan aristocracy. They 
came mostly from the lesser clans, or from the middle classes 
in town and village. They knew at first hand the sufferings of 
the farmers and the small tradesmen. Like M ussolini and Hitler, 
they claimed to be the friend of the common man. They bit-
terly ''denounced the "corrupt alliance" of the political parties 
and the capitalists. 
All this was part of their fight for political control at home. 
They wa~ted a "national socialist" reformation in Japan. By 
this they meant that the army, under the Emperor, should run 
the government. They wanted the political parties suppressed 
and industry run by the state-all, as they said, for the benefit 
of the conlmon man. 
On the home front, the army extremists have had little suc-
cess. None of their glowing promises of economic "reforms" 
has been carried out. In the foreign field, however, their pro-
gram has been largely adopted. We must now see what their 
aims in foreign policy were. 
THE DEMAND FOR "LiVING SPACE" 
At the heart of the military-fascist program in Japan, just as 
in Germany and Italy, lay a demand for territorial expansion. 
The army extremists made careful plans for a series of bold 
moves. First, Manchuria and Mongolia were to be conquered, 
then China, then the rest of Asia. In the past decade we have 
seen this seemingly wild and visionary program translated into 
reality to an extraordinary degree. In fact, the actual course 
of Japan's foreign policy has follow~d it very .closely. 
With territorial expansion was linked an economic idea-
that of regional self-sufficiency, or the "bloc economy." In 
193 I, Manchuria was called Japan's "economic life-line." In 
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1932-33 the watchword was the "Japan-Manchou~uo economic 
bloc." After 1937 the demand was for a "Japan-China-Man-
choukuo bloc." Finally, the slogan today is for a "Greater East 
Asia," to include the rich territories of Indo-China, Malaya, 
the East Indies and the Philippines. . 
What the army leaders were chiefly seeking through this 
program was to overcome Japan's dependence on the interna-
tional market. They were proposing a basic alternative to 
Shidehara's plan for the peaceful development of international 
trade. In 1930-31 they had seen Japan's foreign trade suddenly 
collapse, plunging the country into an economic crisis. They 
were determined that this should not happen again. The 
answer, they felt, lay in extending Japan's political control 
over a vast region. The markets and raw materials of such an 
area, they thought, would make Japan economically inde-
pendent of the rest of the world. 
WEIGHTING THE SCALES 
The army extremists were not the only ones to share these 
views. They had supporters in the bureaucracy, even in the 
highest positions. Many naval officers also supported them, 
although the navy as a whole was more conservative than the 
army. And, despite their anti-capitalist propaganda, they had 
close relations with some business groups who hoped to profit 
from the expansion program. 
Though the military-fascist leaders did not succeed in 
organizing a unified mass fascist party, they wielded extraor-
dinary powers. They influenced public opinion through the 
Ex-Servicemen's Association, with its three million members. 
They also had a host of reactionary so~ieties to work through. 
S<:>me of them were dignified patriotic societies, with members 
from the highest ranks of Japanese society. Others went in for 
espionage, strike-breaking, or outright terrorism. Finally, the 
army had its special powers under the Constitution, such as 
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dictating the choice of War Minister, and going direct to the 
Emperor over the head of the Premier. 
To all these powers the extremists now added two special 
techniques and used them for all they were worth. One was 
resorting directly to military action, without waiting for 
authorization from the Cabinet. Underlings in the field could 
plot "incidents" which committed their superior officers and 
the government to certain courses of action. The Manchurian 
occupation was largely brought about in this way. 
The second technique was terrorism, or direct action, against 
political opponents at home. Public opinion in Japan does not 
automatically condemn assassination, especially if it appears to \ 
have been inspired by patriotic or disinterested motives. The 
list of distinguished Japanese who have been assassinated is 
very long-Okubo, Ito, Hara (the first commoner to become 
Premier), Hamaguchi, to mention a few. Since 1931 many 
others have been added to this list, and their deaths have all 
helped the military-fascists to rise to power. 
AGAINST THE ARMY? 
On the surface it has often seemed that the capitalists were the 
chief opponents of the army extremists in the political struggle 
of the past decade. This is only partly true. These two groups 
have been the strongest political forces in Japan. They {lave 
both sought to win the bureaucrats and public opinion to their 
side. On the other hand, they are in agreement on many points. 
For the capitalists, as well as the military, are interested in 
territorial expansion, and have taken advantage of its results 
in China. Many of them favored the Manchurian invasion, 
because they saw that it would give the widespread social dis-
content in Japan a safe outlet. But at the same time, the cap-
italists tend to be more cautious than the army leaders in for-
eign policy. They do not want to take risks, or to plunge reck-
lessly into a big war if the chances of success are slight., 
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Even on the home front, there is an area of agreement 
between the army extremists and the business men. Both wish 
to maintain their ruling position against the threat of social 
revolution. The Minseito government took measures to stamp 
out revolutionary groups as early as 1929-30. There is full 
agreement on regimentation of this kind. But the capitalists 
have bitterly opposed the army's efforts to take over all politi-
cal power, or to seize control of their business enterprises. 
Keeping these general tendencies in mind, we can now turn 
to a consideration of the events of the past decade. 
THE EXTREMISTS TAKE DIRECT ACTION 
The "Mukden incident" of September 18, 1931 marked the 
halfway point in the sharp political struggle which was then 
convulsing Japan. Its violent phase la.sted for eight months 
longer, until May IS, 193 2 • 
We have already seen the first result of this struggle-the 
overthrow of the Minseito Cabinet. The Seiyukai party took 
up the reins of power in mid-December 193 I. It proved to be 
the last one-party government to hold office during that 
decade. Inukai, its Premier, was a moderate; so also was Taka-
hashi, the aged Finance Minister. General Araki, symbol and 
titular leader of the army extremists, was the Minister of War. 
Not content with having forced a change of Cabinet, the 
extremists still pressed the attack on party government. Inouye, 
Finance Minister in the previous Minseito Cabinet, was assas-
sinated on February 9, and Baron Dan, head of the Mitsui 
interests, was shot on March 5. Both were victims of the 
Blood Brotherhood League, organized to use terrorism against 
the "corrupt political parties, slaves of the capitalists." More 
plots followed. Then, on May IS, 1932, Premier Inukai in turn 
was assassinated. His death was the climax of an outbreak sup-
ported by high army officers, who had planned to seize con-
trol of the government. 
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CONQUEST IN MANCHURIA 
After this affair, things quieted down a little at home. But the 
extremists had meanwhile had their way in the sphere of for-
eign policy. Japanese 'troops had spread over most of Man-
churia. In February the Japanese attack on Shanghai had 
occurred. In March the "independent" state of Manchoukuo 
was established. Far from being independent, it was really the 
plaything of Japan's army extremists who had planned the 
"Mukden incident." 
Another year passed before the Manchurian issues were fully 
ironed out. In September 1932 the Japanese government for-
mally recognized Manchouku9. Early in 1933, on the basis of 
the Lytton Report, the League of Nations passed judgment 
on Japan. The army at once moved again in Manchuria. In 
March 1933 Japanese troops occupied J ehol province, and 
added it to Manchoukuo. In lVlay these troops advanced to the 
gates of Peiping and Tientsin, and enforced "demilitarization" 
of the region immediately south of the Great Wall of China. 
Meanwhile, Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations. 
F or the time, her conquest of l\1anchuria had been made good 
in her own eyes, if not in the eyes of the world. 
PEACEFUL INTERLUDE (1933-35) 
The period from the middle of 1933 to the end of 1935 was 
"peaceful" only by contrast with the years before and after. 
The contrast is sufficiently striking, however, to justify our 
using the term. 
Two strong Cabinets, headed in turn by Admirals Saito and 
Okada, old-line naval administrators opposed to extremism, 
governed Japan during these years. The Saito Cabinet had 
entered office in May 1932, after the death of Inukai. Party 
men held only a few of the lesser Ministries. Nevertheless, the 
Cabinet was in the main moderate. The key Finance Ministry, 
in particular, was in the capable hands of Takahashi, Who 
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allowed only limited increases in the defense budgets. Early 
in 1934 the fiery Araki resigned from the War MiniStry. 
Araki's successor carried out a partial "purge" of the army 
extremists. 
KEEPING THE ARMY QUIET 
There were several reasons for this moderate trend. For one 
thing, foreign trade had turned upwards in 1932, and by 1935 
Japan was again enjoying a trade boom which soon overcame 
the worst effects of the economic crisis and tended to calm 
the political waters. 
In the second place, the army extremists were kept busy 
with their experiment in Manchoukuo, where they were trying 
to realize their goal of "state socialism." They were building 
strategic railways, and fostering the growth of Manchurian 
industry. They met with opposition from business interests at 
home, and found it hard to raise sufficient capital for their 
projects in Manchuria. In order to secure greater influence 
over these economic questions, the extremists forced the estab-
lishment inside the Cabinet of a lVlanchoukuo Affairs Board. 
Here the army was in the saddle. And the extremists did secure 
enough capital for their projects to provoke the wise old 
Takahashi into issuing a warning that Japan's finances could 
not stand such a large and continuing investment drain: to 
lVlanchoukuo. 
On the whole, however, the army men were disappointed 
with the economic results in Manchoukuo. By 1935 they were 
trying to bring North China into their Manchurian realm, and 
thus enlarge their economic bloc. In November 1935 Doihara, 
the "Lawrence of Manchuria," tried to detach five of the 
northern provinces from Chinese control. The extremists also 
planned these moves as part of an effort to strengthen their 
position at home. For there they were being steadily pushed 
into the background. 
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DYING FLICKERS OF DEMOCRACY 
Plots were still being hatched within Japan, even during this 
"peaceful" period. But the moderates were reasserting their 
control. They kept the high posts in the Privy Council and 
the Imperial Household Ministry. The Cabinet was firmly set 
for a moderate course. Even the parties' strength was reviving. 
The climax of this trend came with the general election of 
February 1936. For the voting showed that the people had 
swung decisively away from the extremists. Japan's labor party 
elected eighteen Diet members" while three left-wing prole-
tarians won Diet seats. It was thought that a new Cabinet, with 
much greater party ~uence, might now be formed. . 
But the extremists were unwilling to admit defeat. Their 
answer came in the military uprising of February 26, 1936-
known in Japan as the "2-26" affair. 
THE 112-2611 UPRISING 
The direct participants in this historic revolt were some 1,400 
troops, with their lower officers. No upper officers openly 
joined them. Yet the insurgents had contact with the highest 
army quarters. And General Mazaki, an outstanding army 
extremist, was kept under detention for a year after the 
outbreak. 
A long death list had been ' prepared. Actually only three 
high officials were killed: Takahashi, the moderate Finance 
Minister; Admiral Saito, the former Premier, then Lord Privy 
Seal; and General Watanabe, who had been responsible for 
shifts in army officerships. Premier Okada escaped, but his 
brother, who resembled him, was killed. Outside of Tokyo 
both Count Makino, former Lord Privy Seal, and Prince 
Saionji, the last Elder Statesman, managed to escape attacks 
directed against them. 
For three days the insurgents occupied the center of Tokyo~ 
They were finally disarmed when it became clear that the 
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revolt was not taking hold anywhere else. Once again, an 
attempt to seize the government had failed. Nevertheless, the 
uprising caused an important shift in the balance of political 
power. The trend toward moderation was reversed. Under 
succeeding Cabinets, new policies were adopted which led 
directly toward the war with China in 1937. 
PRELUDE TO WAR (1936-37) 
The chief result of the "2-26" uprising was to give greater 
power over government policy to the army leaders. This power 
was not exercised by the extremists in person, because the mili-
tary revolt had temporarily discredited them in the people's 
eyes. A new set of army leaders adopted most of their plat-
form, however, and succeeded in putting it across. The public 
strongly opposed the expansionist and military-fascist ten-
dencies of the new program, but could do no more than delay 
its realization. 
The new program took definite shape under the Cabinet 
headed by Hirota, a bureaucrat with extremist leanings. It 
called for stronger pressure on China, expressed in demands for 
"Sino-Japanese cooperation." The anti-Comintem pact was 
concluded with Germany in November 1936. On the home 
front, there were efforts to amend the Election Law in such 
a way as to curb the political influence of the parties. The new 
budget included large increases in defense expenditure. Sec-
tions of heavy industry, interested in the profits to be reaped 
from supplying armaments for the defense services, threw their 
support to the enlarged arms program. On the other hand, pop-
ular opposition to the Hirota Cabinet grew steadily. Following 
strong attacks in the Diet, Hirota resigned in January 1937. 
General Hayashi, the next Premier, barred the recognized 
Minseito and Seiyukai party leaders from his Cabinet. Within 
two months he had carried through the economic planks of 
Hirota's platform. Ikeda and Yuki, representing the business 
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houses, took official posts in order to handle the financial prob-
lems. Premier Hayashi also instituted a Cabinet Planning Board, 
which became an economic general staff for the army program. 
THE PEOPLE VS. THE MILITARY 
These rapid steps toward a "wartime economy" met with bitter 
opposition from the parties and even more from the public at 
large. A wide breach opened up between the Hayashi Cabinet 
and the people. When Hayashi dissolved the Diet, he was over-
whelmingly defeated in the general election of April 1937. 
Out of 466 members in the Diet's lower house, the government 
elected less than 50 supporters. It tried to stay in office, but 
finally, on l\1ay 31, had to resign. 
The popular disapproval of the military-fascist program was 
shown quite unmistakably in this election-even more unmis-
takably than in the earlier election of February 1936. At that 
time, the extremists had defeated the will of the people by the 
"2-26" uprising. This time they used ne\v methods. 
Under the Konoye Cabinet, national unity was restored-at 
least to all outward appearances. Party members were included 
in the Cabinet, and Prince Konoye was made the symbol of 
unity. But the party men chosen for Cabinet posts were in sym-
pathy with the military-fascist program, and in any case held 
only minor offices. The chief Ministries were cornered by the 
army leaders and by bureaucrats who supported them. 
But merely setting up a new Cabinet was not enough to quell 
the widespread suspicion of the army's aims. It was necessary 
to quiet opposition voices, reestablish the army's prestige and 
really get somewhere with the "controlled economy" plans. 
How could all this be done? Two months after the Konoye 
Cabinet entered office, Japan was at war with China. 
XII. War with China 
Few of Japan's leaders expected that the war with China would 
last for years. Their original plans called for a short campaign 
of five or six months. North China, Shanghai and Nanking 
would be occupied. Chiang Kai-shek's crack divisions would 
be destroyed in the Shanghai-Nanking operations. By Christ-
mas, at the latest, a dictated peace could be imposed at Nanking. 
VICTORIES WITHOUT PEACE 
On the military side, these calculations proved surprisingly 
accurate. The victorious Japanese troops were entering Nan-
king in mid-December. And all the strategic railways in North 
China were under Japan's control. But these military successes-
did not lead to the expected peace settlement. China's national 
unity held firm, and Chinese resistance continued. If Japan 
wished to dictate peace terms, she would have to wage further 
battle. 
This she proceeded to do. Two big campaigns were fought 
during 1938. In May, after a bitter struggle in Shantung prov-
ince, Japan's northern and southern armies were able to join 
forces. In October, after an exhausting advance up the Yangtze 
River, the Japanese captured Hankow. A lightning blow in the 
south led to the occupation of Canton. 
China's main cities, and much of her railway system, were 
now in Japanese hands. But . still there was no sign of peace. 
By the end of 1938, it was clear that, despite her military tri-
umphs, Japan had not won victory. The war had lasted 
eighteen months, instead of six. In lives and money, it had cost 
Japan far more than the original reckoning. And the end was 
not in sight. 
What was happening at home during these first eighteen 
months of the war? Three main trends were clear. First, all 
popular opposition to the war was suppressed. Second, the 
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military took over conduct of affairs in China, allowing the 
Cabinet little or no say. And third, a "controlled economy" 
was set up, although the army leaders did not succeed in get-
ting it into their hands. The business houses either pared down 
the controls, or decided how they were to be applied. 
MAKING THE PUBLIC TOE THE LINE 
Various measures to gain public support of the war were 
adopted. The most spectacular was a campaign for "national 
spiritual mobilization." It began on September 1 I, 1937 with 
a patriotic rally in Tokyo, addressed by the Premier and other 
Cabinet Ministers and broadcast throughout the country. In 
the Diet the parties expressed their support of the war. Even 
Japan's labor party, which had elected 36 Diet members in 
April 1937, swung behind the war policy. The authorities were 
not content, however. In December 1937, the Home Ministry 
carried out large-scale police raids, in which hundreds of per-
sons were arrested. Two left-wing labor and party groups, both 
headed by Kanju Kato, were disbanded without notice. Kato 
himself, who had been elected to the Diet by a proletarian con-
stituency in Tokyo, was jailed. The arrests also included 
Baroness Ishimoto, a noted feminist leader, and a great many 
liberals and pacifists. 
All sections of Japan's ruling circles were united in this pro-
gram of suppressing popular opposition to the war. There was 
more scope for disagreement, however, over how the war in 
China should be conducted. But in this dispute the army held 
all the points of vantage, and soon reigned supreme. 
THE ARMY WINS A FREE HAND IN CHINA 
Control of military and naval operations in and off China was 
given in November 1937 to the Imperial Headquarters. This 
special organ included all the high army and navy officers. 
Since it decided military policy under the direct authority of 
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the Emperor, it neatly sidetracked Cabinet control. Non-mili-
tary phases of policy in China, however, were not so easily 
disposed of. Here the army used a technique which it had tried 
and tested in Manchuria. In September 1938 army leaders 
forced the establishment of a China Affairs Board, set up within 
the Cabinet but run by military men. Through this board the 
army kept economic and political affairs in China pretty well 
under its thumb, despite some continued opposition from the 
Foreign Ministry. In the broader field of international policy 
the struggle for power was more acute. It still continues, 
although the army eventually became strong enough to put 
through the alliance with Germany and Italy. 
THE ECONOMIC WAR MACHINE 
The third main trend of which we spoke was the establishment 
of a wartime "controlled economy" in Japan. The state took 
over more and more control of the economic life of the coun-
try. Both army and businessmen agreed that such control was 
necessary, but bitterly disagreed as to how it should be applied. 
On the whole, the businessmen managed to keep the most 
important economic regulations in their own hands. 
The fiercest political struggle during 1938 was waged over 
the National Mobilization Bill. Drafted by the Planning Board 
under army influence, this measure called for drastic economic 
conscription. The government was to have practically unlim-
ited control of social and economic life, including finance, 
industry, trade, labor and the press. With respect to labor, the 
bill provided for compulsory allocation of workers to their 
jobs, prohibited strikes and lockouts, and empowered the gov-
ernment to fix wages, hours and working conditions. 
This bill met with determined opposition in the Diet. Army 
supporters, using pressure and intimidation, including terroris-
tic attacks on Diet members and on party headquarters in 
Tokyo, pushed it through. Nevertheless, the opposition did 
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force certain modifications in the original plan. Premier 
Konoye pledged that it would be applied only. during a war-
time emergency and not invoked in the Sino-Japanese conflict, , 
which was still referred to in Japan as an "incident." The 
Premier also agreed to appoint a majority of Diet members 
to the National Mobilization Council. This Council was to be 
consulted before Imperial ordinances applying various sections 
of the bill were issued. 
But on May 5, 1938, despite Konoye's pledge to the Diet, 
several of the main provisions of the bill were applied, and new 
ordinances issued since have put many others into effect. 
Before Premier Konoye's resignation in January 1939, a broad 
series of control measures was in operation. Foreign exchange 
was strictly licensed. To make up the huge war budgets the 
government had taken over control of capital, and restricted 
new investment to a list of so-called "essential" industries. It 
also rigidly regulated trade, limiting the export and impon of 
several hundred commodities. It put the labor control pro-
visions of the National Mobilization Act into effect. In June 
1938 it instituted nation-wide price control for certain com-
modities, and has since steadily increased the list of such goods. 
The Home Ministry enrolled several thousand "economic 
police" officers to enforce the price schedules and other fea-
tures of the economic program. 
THE MEN AT THE CONTROLS 
But despite the sweeping nature of these provISIons, the 
business houses managed to keep a fair amount of indepen-
dence. Their own men took key positions in many of the 
agencies that were enforcing the control measures. In the field 
of capital investment, they could still tip the scales. They suc-
cessfully resisted army pressure for outright state control and 
operation of industry. Nationalization of the vital electric 
power industry, for instance, over which they fought long and 
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bitterly, was finally put through only part way, and has been 
a subject of continued dispute. 
So it was not the military leaders alone, but the military lead-
ers in an uneasy partnership with the businessmen and the 
party heads, who carried out the wartime economic program. 
The army fascists charted the program, it is true, but they were 
not allo,ved to run it in their own sweet way. The army ruled 
in China, as it had in Manchuria. But it was not the unchal-
lenged dictator at home. There, it shared power with "big busi-
ness." And big business, despite war restrictions, still operated 
its own enterprises and still reaped its dividends. 
STALEMATE IN CHINA 
A Cabinet under Prince Konoye had held office throughout the 
first phase of the war in China. It resigned in January 1939, 
when China's refusal to accept a dictated peace had become 
unmistakable. For Japan now no longer won spectacular vic-
tories. A stalemate had developed, and the war had become 
a war of attrition. This second phase of the war lasted for 
another eighteen months-until June 1940, when Hitler's vic-
tories in Europe shifted the balance of power in the Far East. 
The costs to Japan of this second period were no less than 
before. She had to maintain the same number of troops in 
China, totaling 800,000 or 1,000,000. Heavy fighting was tak-
ing place almost continuously. But the hostilities, ranging from 
Canton to Inner Mongolia, led to no decisive results. In some 
cases Japan occupied new cities, such as Nanchang, Nanning 
and Ichang. In other cases Japanese offensives were disastrously 
routed. Chinese guerrillas, ranging far and wide, limited Japan's 
area of effective control, even in the so-called "occupied" ter-
ritory. Moreover, the economic gains were not as great as the 
army had expected. Sales of Japanese goods to China steadily 
increased, but imports of Chinese raw materials either declined 
or rose very slowly. 
STEPPING ON WESTERN TOES 
At the same time Japan's interference with the interests of the 
Western powers in China became much more direct, and cre-
ated serious friction. Difficulties were most acute at Tientsin, 
Shanghai and Amoy. The Japanese army imposed various 
restrictions. It kept Western shipping off the Yangtze River 
above Shanghai, and the Pearl River below Canton. Western 
traders had to face many practices-tariffs, exchange controls, 
import and export controls-which were put into effect espe-
cially to hamper their trade. The Japanese enforced a blockade 
of the British and French Concessions at Tientsin, and stripped 
British citizens for examination before allowing them to enter 
or leave their Concession. Although the Western powers 
resented these Japanese actions, they limited their opposition 
mainly to protests. In July 1939 the United States abrogated 
its trade treaty with Japan, but did not follow up this step by 
imposing trade penalties. 
THREE JAPANESE WAR CABINETS 
Difficulties on Japan's home front mounted steadily during the 
second phase of the war. The strain was shown in many ways. 
One was the rapidity with which Cabinets succeeded one 
another. The first Konoye Cabinet, as we have seen, had held 
office for nineteen months-from June 1937 to January 1939. 
In the second period (January 1939 to July 1940), there were 
no less than three Cabinets. Their average length of life was 
only six months. These Cabinets, with their Premiers, held 
office as follows: 
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I. Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, January 5, 1939 to August 
29, 1939 
2. General Nobuyuki Abe, August 30, 1939 to January 
IS, 1940 
3. Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, January 16, 1940 to July 
16, 1940. 
HIRANUMA AND THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT 
Many of the decisive events of this period were closely related 
to the Cabinet changes. Hiranuma, for example, was forced 
out of office by the Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939. 
During that summer the Hiranuma Cabinet had been dickering 
with Germany over the details of a proposed military pact, 
while the Japanese army had been fighting a minor war with 
the Soviet Union on the Outer Mongolian frontier. So the 
Soviet-German pact came as a stunning blow to Tokyo, and 
for a time feelings against Germany ran high. The army 
extremists, who had strongly advocated an alliance with Ger-
many, were discredited along with Hiranuma. Consequently, 
extremist influence was not so great in the next two Cabinets, 
headed by General Abe and Admiral Y onai. 
ABE AND THE PRICE OF RICE 
The Abe Cabinet was overthrown five months later for reasons 
entirely different, but equally significant. Here the issue turned 
mainly on Japan's growing economic difficulties. During the 
winter of 1939-40 a rice shortage developed, and "bootleg" 
prices soared toward 50 yen per koku (the five bushel unit)-
dangerously close to the level which stimulated the "rice riots" 
of 1918. In September 1938 the Abe Cabinet had fixed ceilings 
on all prices. When the rice shortage developed, it had to back 
down on its own ruling. In November it raised the official 
price from 38 to 43 yen per koku. By this time, however, the 
farmers had already sold their crops, and the gains were reaped 
by the rice dealers. 
Outspoken criticisms were expected in the Diet and, rather 
than meet them, the Abe Cabinet resigned in mid-January. The 
incoming Y onai Cabinet had to face the music. One outspoken 
member of the Minseito party, Takao Saito, challenged not 
only economic conditions, but the war itself. His striking 
speech of February 2, 1940 attacked Wang Ching-wei's pro-
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posed regime (Japan's puppet government) in China as noth-
ing more than a "central government in name." After casting 
doubt on the prospects of achieving the "new order in East 
Asia," he asked what the Japanese people had received in 
return for their great sacrifices in the war. Even more serious, 
in the eyes of Japan's army leaders, was Saito's declaration that, 
in view of China's large territory and army, it "is doubtful 
whether Japan can overthrow" Chiang Kai-shek's regime. A 
critical electric power "famine" which developed at this time, 
and forced many factories to shut down, underlined the truth 
in Saito's remarks. The Japanese people backed Saito so 
strongly that several months passed before the authorities 
dared to expel him from the Diet. 
YONAI TRAILS TOO FAR BEHIND NAZI PUSH 
But Hitler's military victories in the spring of 1940, and espe-
cially the ,defeat of France, swiftly altered Japan's position in 
the Far East. The "moderation" which the Abe and Y onai 
Cabinets had shown in foreign policy suddenly vanished. 
Intense pressure was brought to bear on the French authorities 
in the Far East. In June the French Ambassador at Tokyo 
agreed to stop shipments of goods to China over the Indo-
China Railway. Less than a month later, the British govern-
ment also bowed to the Japanese demand that the Burma Road 
be closed for three months. But these gains were not enough 
for the extremist elements within Japan. They had received 
a fresh impetus from Hitler's successes, and were prepared to 
move far more boldly both on the home and foreign fronts. 
The War Minister, maneuvering for the set-up of an equally 
bold and impetuous Cabinet, suddenly offered his resignation. 
Thus, on July 16, 1940, the Yonai Cabinet crumbled. 
XIII. Shadow Over Asia 
Under the second Konoye Cabinet, formed July 22, 1940, 
the flood that had been sweeping over Japan since 1931 reached 
a new high. Territorial aims were enlarged. Expansion was no 
longer to be confined to China. The goal was now a "Greater 
East Asia," including all the rich colonial territories in southern 
Asiatic waters. At home, also, the pace quic.kened. The army 
leaders moved toward full suppression of the parties, and a 
reduction of the Diet's powers. Obstacles to foreign expansion 
and internal regimentation continued to exist, however, and 
slowed down the fascist advance. 
In foreign policy, the Konoye Cabinet made two far-reach-
ing moves. On September 27, 1940 it concluded a military alli-
ance with Germany and Italy. By this alliance, as we have seen, 
Japan was allotted "Greater East Asia" for her "living space." 
This sphere, however, was not yet under Japanese control. It 
had to be won. So the second move was a step in the direction 
of winning it. It was a move into Indo-China. 
In September 1940, a French-Japanese agreement admitted 
a limited number of Japanese troops to northern districts of the 
French colony of Indo-China. These troops were the entering 
wedge. Then Japan pushed her control southward to Saigon. 
Early in 194 I, Tokyo dictated a settlement of the Thailand-
Indo-China conflict, which she hoped would eventually yield 
her full control of Indo-China, and still greater powers over 
Thailand, where Japanese influence was already strong. And 
Saigon, we should add, is only 650 miles north of Singapore. 
A HARD ROW TO HOE 
In other respects, however, the Konoye Cabinet's expansionist 
program-like that of its predecessors-did not enjoy easy 
going. For the war in China was still not won. In November 
1940 Japan formally recognized Wang Ching-wei's Nanking 
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regime (the puppet government she herself had created). But 
this step merely spotlighted Japan's failure to secure peace in 
China. Tokyo also undertook negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, but with little immediate result. Finally, the British 
and the Dutch strengthened the defenses of both Malaya and 
the Netherlands Indies, and the American fleet at Hawaii served 
as an eloquent warning against any move by Japan on Singa-
pore, strategic key to southeast Asia. 
THE HOME FRONT 
On the home front, the Konoye Cabinet clamped down even 
firmer dictatorial control. All political parties "voluntarily" 
dissolved in the summer of 1940. There was a plan afoot to 
curb the Diet's influence by amending the Election Law to 
give fewer people votes. And the extremists began to organize 
a mass fascist party, with local units throughout the country. 
These efforts achieved some practical results. The outspoken 
criticism marking previous Diet sessions was less apparent in 
1940-41. The "near neighbor" groups, set up by the new fascist 
party, gave the authorities a means of checking up closely on 
popular opinion, and taking measures to suppress opposition as 
soon as it appeared. Economic difficulties were piling up, and 
the need for repression was becoming greater. Rationing of 
sugar, charcoal and matches, begun in 1940, was extended to 
rice early in 1941. 
A HORSE TRADE 
But the political struggle within Japan, even among its ruling 
circles, was not settled by the Konoye government's actions. 
On the contrary, it continued as strong as ever. A characteris-
tic "deal" indicated the lines along which the struggle was 
being fought. The military-fascist groups were unwilling to 
permit a general election, due in 1941, to take place. On the 
other hand, the moderates opposed moves to revise the Election 
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Law and to strengthen state control over industry. In January 
1941, a deal was made in which the extremists agreed to drop 
these moves, while the moderates consented to let the Diet run 
on without an election for one year, and to support the govern-
ment's program in the meantime. 
EXPANSION OR DEFEAT? 
In the early months of 1941, Tokyo increasingly committed 
itself to a policy dictated by the results of a decade of aggres-
sion. Since 1937 Japan had spent nearly 20 billion yen on the 
war in China, or twice the total national debt in 1936. She had 
suffered more than a million casualties, in killed, wounded and 
diseased. In return for these great losses, she expected vast gains. 
Thus "Greater East Asia" became the avowed goal of Japan's 
foreign policy. To Japan's rulers, it represented the full flower-
ing of the "bloc economy" idea. They now considered not 
only Manchuria and China, but the whole of East Asia, neces-
sary for such a bloc. The raw materials of southeast Asia, espe-
cially the oil, tin and rubber of the Indies and Malaya, were 
needed to make up the deficiencies of a "J apan-China-lVlan-
choukuo" bloc. But even with these rich prizes Japan would 
not be entirely self-sufficient economically. She would still lack 
high-grade machinery and certain other products. Nevertheless, 
with the raw materials of East Asia firmly under her control, 
Japan believed she would have sufficient bargaining power to 
secure the foreign currency necessary for buying all she needed 
in the world market. 
Japanese statesmen continually stressed this idea of an East 
Asiatic bloc in their speeches. To make its realization possible, 
they concluded the alliance with Germany. Barring an out-
right German victory in Europe, however, the difficulties 
which confront Tokyo's advance toward mastery of East Asia 
are still formidable. 
For Japan's economic resources are at a low ebb. Industrial 
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production has begun to decline. Foreign trade is falling off, 
and reserves of foreign currency are low. China is uncon-
quered, and relations with the Soviet Union are uncertain. 
The British Empire and the United States, which stand guard 
over southeast Asia, are the mainstays of Japan's foreign trade. 
By moving against them in that region, Japan. might risk every-
thing gained thus far. For the first time, she would be staking 
her future on a war with powers that control the seas and 
access to world markets. She ,,,ould be facing all the dangers 
that she successfully avoided in the World War of 1914-18. 
Japan's geographical location, close to the scene of action in 
the Far East, is still her great strategic advantage. Her economic 
deficiencies have been, and continue to be, her main source 
of w~kness. The ratio between these two controlling factors 
may well determine the immediate future. Is Japan's new 
Empire to reach out over immensely larger areas, or is it to 
suffer its first great defeat? 
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